University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2011

Public Choice and International Law Compliance:
The Executive Branch Is a "They," Not an "It"
Neomi Rao

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rao, Neomi, "Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a "They," Not an "It"" (2011). Minnesota Law
Review. 387.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/387

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Public Choice and International Law
Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a
“They,” Not an “It”
Neomi Rao†
I.

Situating the Public Choice Approach .............................. 201
A. Unitary State Theories and International Law
Compliance .................................................................... 203
1. Realism and Rational Choice Theory .................... 203
2. Responding to Realism ........................................... 208
3. Limits of Unitary Actor Theories .......................... 211
B. Liberal Approaches: Disaggregating the State .......... 212
C. Bringing Together the "They" and the "It" ................. 215
D. The Centrality of the Executive Branch ..................... 216
E. The ―Softness‖ of International Law ........................... 220
II. Public Choice of International Law Compliance .............. 223
A. An Overview of Public Choice Theory ......................... 224
B. International Law Interpretation in the Executive
Branch ........................................................................... 228
1. State Department Legal Adviser .......................... 230
2. Department of Defense Office of the General
Counsel .................................................................... 238
3. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel .... 243
† Assistant professor, George Mason University School of Law. For their
comments, I thank David Bernstein, Lisa Bernstein, Michelle Boardman, Eric
Claeys, Richard Klingler, Nelson Lund, William Marshall, John McGinnis,
Mary Ellen O‘Connell, Jeffrey Parker, Jeremy Rabkin, David Schleicher, Ilya
Somin, Mark Weisburd, John Yoo, Todd Zywicki, and participants at the University of Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop, the Law & Economics Center
Manne Faculty Forum, the University of North Carolina faculty workshop,
and the George Mason Levy Workshop. Stephanie Cook provided helpful research assistance. I am grateful to the many former government officials, including friends and former colleagues, who shared their experiences about the
process of legal decision making within the executive branch. A number of observations in this paper are drawn from my experience in the White House
Counsel‘s Office as Associate Counsel and Special Assistant to the President.
Copyright © 2011 by Neomi Rao.

194

2011] PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

195

4. National Security Council Legal Advisor ............. 249
III. Coordination Failures and Competition Within the
Executive Branch ................................................................ 251
A. Imperfect Coordination ................................................ 252
B. Instability Encourages Competition ........................... 256
C. President‘s Advantage? ................................................ 257
IV. Consequences of Public Choice Analysis ........................... 260
A. Limitations of Unitary State Theories ........................ 261
B. Exploiting the Indeterminacy of
International Law ......................................................... 267
1. Competition Creates Incentives for Flexible
Interpretation ......................................................... 267
2. An Institutional Preference for Soft Law ............. 271
C. Sustaining the Flexibility of International Law ........ 273
Conclusion .................................................................................. 277
Novel questions raised by the war on terror and the evolving technology of warfare have highlighted the importance of
executive branch legal interpretation. In particular, agencies
often address difficult questions about the scope and application of international law without review by Congress or the
courts. The executive branch in the United States stands at the
forefront of analyzing legal consequences following from the use
of force—but the President may have to contend with conflicting advice.
For example, after September 11, 2001, President George
W. Bush had to determine whether al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were entitled to prisoner of war (POW) protections under
the Geneva Conventions. As has now been widely reported, his
advisers disagreed about what to do.1 The Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel argued that neither group was entitled to legal protection, although the President could choose to
apply the Geneva Conventions to either group.2 The State Department argued that the Conventions should apply to both
groups and that a failure to do so would weaken the United
States‘ relationships with its allies and undermine the ability
1. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); JOHN YOO, WAR BY
OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER‘S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006).
2. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep‘t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales], available at www.justice.gov/olc/
docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf (including subject line ―Application of
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees‖).
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to demand POW treatment for captured Americans.3 Military
lawyers from the Department of Defense pressed for application of the Conventions and argued that they were customary
international law.4 President Bush ultimately determined that
the Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda, because the group
was neither a state, nor party to the Conventions.5 The President did not suspend the Conventions with regard to Afghanistan, but found that the Taliban were ―unlawful combatants‖
who had lost their POW status.6 But it didn‘t stop there—after
the President made his decision, memos from the State Department expressing alternative views were leaked to the
press, fueling criticism of the President‘s policy. More recently,
reports have surfaced about internal legal disputes in the Obama Administration over whether congressional authorization
was required under the War Powers Resolution7 for military
actions in Libya8 and also whether the United States can lawfully attack al Qaeda operatives in areas such as Yemen and
Somalia, which are outside the battlefield theater of Afghanistan and areas of Pakistan.9
3. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to the Counsel to the President
and Assistant to the President for Nat‘l Sec. Affairs 1– 4 (Jan. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from Colin L. Powell], available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf.
4. John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2290 (2009) (reporting that some Judge Advocate Generals ―challenged President Bush‘s decision in February 2002 . . . that members of al Qaeda and the Taliban were
not to receive the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions‖
(citing Julian E. Barnes, Military Fought to Abide by War Rules, L.A. TIMES,
June 30, 2006, at A1)).
5. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the U.S., to the Vice
President, Sec‘y of State, Sec‘y of Def., Attorney Gen., Chief of Staff to the
President, Dir. of Cen. Intelligence, Assistant to the President for Nat‘l Sec.
Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Memorandum from George W. Bush], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/
White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (including the subject line ―Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees‖).
6. Id. (―I accept the legal conclusion of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral and the
Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to
suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline
to exercise that authority at this time.‖).
7. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541– 48 (2006).
8. See Charlie Savage, Two Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya Policy
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A1.
9. See Charlie Savage, White House Weighs Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, at A1 (detailing dispute between Department of Defense general counsel Jeh Johnson and State Department legal adviser Harold
Koh over the standards for the use of force outside the battlefield theater).
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Internal disputes among the agencies that handle questions of international law are commonplace, although usually
less visible. This Article examines how this internal dynamic of
conflict and competition within the executive branch shapes the
interpretation and compliance with international law—it
presents a public choice analysis of how the United States complies with international law.
In the United States, even our unitary executive, which exercises significant control over foreign affairs, includes numerous agencies that analyze and interpret the requirements of international law within the framework of their particular
interests and incentives. Lawyers throughout the executive
branch work through issues relating to international law from
the unique perspectives and cultures of their agencies. Executive branch processes for mediating legal disputes are irregular
and inconsistent—they coordinate efforts at best imperfectly
and at worst leave agencies to pursue conflicting interpretations of international law. The executive branch often behaves
as a ―they‖ not an ―it,‖10 even with respect to questions of international law.
This Article describes the particular interests and incentives of the agencies that shape international law interpretation and the institutions available (or not) for coordinating interests. Moreover, it identifies how disaggregated decision
making and imperfect coordination within the executive branch
affect international law compliance in the United States.11 Ana10. This observation has been made of the White House in the context of
the administrative state. E.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (―[ W ]e demonstrate that
scholars may have underestimated the complexity of White House involvement. Presidential control is a ‗they,‘ not an ‗it.‘‖). Kenneth Shepsle notably
made a similar observation for Congress. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is
a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON.
239, 254 (1992) (describing the ―meaninglessness of the concept of ‗legislative
intent.‘ Individuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of
individuals do not‖).
11. I focus on the United States because a public choice analysis must
consider the dynamics within a particular institution. The public choice
framework does not treat states as undifferentiated actors. Yet the consequences of bureaucratic competition for international law compliance in the
United States may shed light on international law compliance more generally
if similar bureaucratic behavior is observed in other states. See infra Part
IV.C. In other countries, there is some evidence of conflicts between agencies
with responsibility for international legal policy. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. SCHARF
& PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 169–74
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lyzing these dynamics provides a richer explanation of how the
executive branch interprets and determines compliance with
international law. The uncertainty and instability of coordination provide an incentive for executive branch officials to compete for control of international policymaking in the White
House. This competition may result in exploiting the flexibility
and ambiguity of international law to serve policy goals. Government officials may benefit from the indeterminacy of international law, particularly in relation to new circumstances for
which these are few relevant precedents and limited if any
state practice.
This Article begins by situating the public choice analysis
of international law. Part I briefly examines some of the competing approaches in international relations and how international law scholars have used them to address questions of
compliance. Many leading approaches to international relations, including natural law, realist, constructivist, and institutional theories, start with an assumption of a unitary state that
behaves as a person in international law. In this view, states
are ―billiard balls‖ or ―black boxes‖ with respect to international relations.12 These theories disagree about how states behave
and, accordingly, make different predictions for whether and
how states will comply with international law. For example,
realist theories treat international law as largely irrelevant to
the behavior of states, and rational choice theorists, such as
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, have argued that states comply with international law only when it is in their self-interest.13
In recent years, the unitary state model has been challenged by
liberal theorists who have focused on domestic non-state actors,
such as government officials and private interest groups. Notably, Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter have highlighted
the disaggregation of the state in international law and identified how government agencies and officials as well as private
entities engage in a transnational process of lawmaking and

(2010) (recounting a discussion with foreign legal advisers about the role of
international law in their countries and how their respective legal adviser offices function).
12. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 11 (2001) (describing ―offensive realism‖ as treating ―states like black
boxes or billiard balls‖).
13. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2005) (theorizing that ―international law emerges from states
acting rationally to maximize their interests‖).
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cooperation below the state level.14 Koh and Slaughter are
largely optimistic about how the involvement of these non-state
actors will improve precision and compliance with international
law.15
Unitary and disaggregated theories have largely talked
past each other. Although some political scientists in international relations have suggested that these approaches can be
complementary, there has been little work in this direction by
international law scholars. This Article provides one approach
to filling this gap by analyzing how the executive branch tries
to coordinate international law interpretation between agencies
that regularly disagree and compete for control over foreign policymaking. Like disaggregated theories, the public choice account looks inside the ―black box‖ to study domestic actors. Like
unitary theories, it also looks at institutional mechanisms for
coordinating agency interests in the formation of ―state‖ interests. The public choice approach considers the importance of institutional coordination mechanisms in addition to the particular incentives of domestic actors. It considers how the ―they‖ of
the executive branch seeks to function as an ―it.‖
Part II sets forth the public choice of international law
compliance.16 This public choice analysis examines how various
legal departments within the executive branch interpret international law and thereby shape the scope and form of compliance. A number of legal departments have responsibility for
international law interpretation. As explained in greater detail
in Part II, each of these agencies has a particular institutional
perspective, culture, and set of incentives with regard to providing advice about the interpretation and application of international law. For example, the State Department Legal Adviser
14. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 205, 207 (1993) (stating
that ―[ l]iberals focus not on state-to-state interactions . . . but on an analytically prior set of relationships among states and domestic and transnational civil
society‖).
15. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 181, 206 (1996) (arguing that the theory of transnational legal process
―predicts that nations will come into compliance with international norms if
transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other transnational
actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms,
followed by norm-internalization‖).
16. I use the term ―public choice‖ because this Article analyzes the executive branch as a collectivity and examines the interests and incentives of the
government officials who make determinations about international law. See
infra notes 108–19.
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often takes a conscience-based approach to international law
and expresses concerns about diplomatic consequences. The
Department of Defense General Counsel represents a military
tradition and strong commitment to the laws of war. The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel has an institutional
perspective favorable to the exercise of presidential authority.
The National Security Council Legal Advisor serves the President‘s interests and considers international law in light of the
core constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President.
Because of their different interests and perspectives, these
agencies will sometimes conflict in their interpretation of international law and the President will have to assess these different perspectives. Ordinary executive branch mechanisms
avoid conflict on most run-of-the mill legal issues, however,
disputes will frequently arise with respect to high-stakes questions.
Part III explains how the executive branch has difficulty
consistently coordinating these divergent interests. Bureaucratic competition is especially prevalent with respect to foreign
affairs and national security because a number of agencies
have overlapping jurisdiction in this area. Although several offices have authority to resolve disputes over legal interpretation, there is no singular mechanism for resolving such disputes. The unpredictability of this process encourages agencies
to compete for control over international policy. Even after a
presidential decision, agencies may continue to resist by appealing to Congress, the media, or other nations. Failures of
coordination and uncertainty create an incentive for ongoing
competition between different bureaucratic interests. Such
competition may make it difficult for the President to assert
and maintain control over agencies. Yet the President may
benefit from a system that allows for the full exchange and consideration of different alternatives with regard to foreign policy
and international law. Institutions may be designed less for
consistency and more for maximizing flexibility and responsiveness to particular circumstances.
Part IV examines some of the consequences of the public
choice analysis. First, this analysis may complement some unitary theories by providing greater information about the actors
and institutions that formulate state interests. In particular, it
complements rational choice theories by looking at the incentives of government officials who determine the inputs for the
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state‘s interest with respect to international law and foreign
policy.
Second, public choice analysis predicts that ongoing competition between agencies will encourage them to take advantage
of indeterminacy in international law. New types of warfare
and evolving technological capacity make indeterminacy about
the content and application of international law particularly
acute. Agencies will use the imprecision or uncertainty of international law strategically to suit their policy agendas. Repeated use of international law for political, strategic, and instrumental ends may create habits of flexible or instrumental
compliance, rather than the more robust compliance predicted
by liberal disaggregated theories. Whereas Koh and Slaughter
predict that the involvement of non-state actors will result in
greater compliance with international law, the public choice
approach supports realist or rational choice predictions that
states comply with international law when it is in their interests and not for other legal or moral reasons. Moreover, if government officials in other countries face similar incentives, one
might expect international law to retain its actual or perceived
softness. This provides an explanation based on sub-state interests for why international law does not exhibit the clarity
and stronger enforcement mechanisms often considered an aspiration for international law.
Disputes within the executive branch over the meaning
and application of international law have important consequences for our foreign policy. These disputes are often kept
behind closed doors, but once revealed they provide valuable information about how the President assesses legal questions,
particularly those arising from the use of force. The spread of
the war on terror and technological advances that allow for intelligence gathering and attacks by unmanned drones present
new and evolving questions under international law. The executive branch will have to assess these questions in the first
instance as it determines foreign and military policy, often with
only the limited involvement of Congress and the courts. The
public choice approach provides one way to understand this dynamic and suggests some consequences for compliance with international law.
I. SITUATING THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH
Theories of international law compliance usually begin
with some conception of the state and how it behaves in re-
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sponse to the requirements of international law. This Part provides context for the public choice approach by briefly considering some of the leading theories of international relations and
international law and demonstrating the gap that is filled by
the public choice method.
The public choice analysis in this Article looks at the agencies and individuals in the executive branch who determine
compliance with international law—a disaggregated approach
that focuses on domestic decision making. It looks inside the
―black box‖ of the state and pulls apart the incentives and interests of officials and bureaucracies within the executive
branch. It then examines the available institutions and procedures within the executive branch for coordinating and aggregating these interests, and considers how these institutions affect agency interests and incentives.17 While some theories
focus on unitary state explanations and others draw on domestic approaches, this Article seeks some combination by examining the domestic interests and incentives of executive agencies
as well as coordinating institutions that bring together disparate and competing interests.18 It examines some of the domestic interests that make up the ―state‘s‖ interest and behavior
with respect to international law compliance.
Furthermore, as I briefly explain in this Part, this Article
focuses on the executive branch because of the central role that
the President plays with respect to the interpretation of, and
compliance with, international law. All three branches have
important constitutional authority in this area, but the executive makes many of the on-the-ground decisions about international law. Second, the characteristics of international law matter, and I explain the importance of areas of ―softness‖ in
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Political scientists have sought to open the ―black box‖ of states to see
how domestic processes affect foreign policy and international relations. Some
of the best work in this area has sought to bring together realism with a consideration of domestic processes, studying how domestic preferences and conflicts are resolved through institutions that affect state behavior in international relations. See, e.g., BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & DAVID LALMAN, WAR
AND REASON: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES 18–19 (1992) (―Our
model of rationality, then, ultimately joins together the two main intellectual
traditions in international relations: the realist viewpoint and the domestic
perspective.‖); Helen V. Milner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics, 52 INT‘L ORG. 759,
759 (1998) (observing that ―[t]he central paradigms of the field of international
relations (IR)—realism and neoliberal institutionalism—have ignored a key
aspect of international relations: domestic politics‖).
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international law for predictions about compliance. International law varies both with respect to its level of domestic obligation and also with the extent of its legalization. In particular,
international law may be indeterminate as applied to new and
evolving forms of warfare and technological advances. The perceived or actual indeterminacy of international law affects how
government actors interpret and apply international law by inviting policy judgments and allowing for a range of plausible or
defensible interpretations.
A. UNITARY STATE THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMPLIANCE
The traditional analogy between states and persons has
served as a foundation for many different theories that disagree
about fundamental aspects of state behavior, including why
states formulate international law, and how and whether they
comply with such law. Unitary theories put aside the individuals, entities, and interests that go into formulating state action.
They model the state as a singular entity in order to provide
theoretical predictions about state behavior with respect to international law.
1. Realism and Rational Choice Theory
The natural law literature analogizes the state in international relations to persons in the state of nature.19 The analogy
envisioned both states and individuals as autonomous, liberal
agents20 and drew from the analogy many of the traditional
prerogatives of states, including the basic tenets of sovereignty.
Accordingly, the state had the characteristics of an individual—
a singular unified entity that could act in the field of international relations with and against other states. For example,
Hobbes repeatedly drew a connection between man in the state
of nature and nations in the international realm. The analogy
between persons and states occurred in a context in which both
19. Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The Analogy Between Natural Persons and
International Persons in the Law of Nations, 26 YALE L.J. 564, 564 –75 (1917)
(discussing the analogy between natural and international persons considered
by natural law thinkers such as Grotius, Hobbes, Rutherforth, and Pufendorf ).
20. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 14
(1999) (tracing the development of the analogy between the independent state
and the liberal individual agent through modern political theorists and arguing that ―there is no powerful theorist of a rights-based liberalism who has
not subscribed to the basic account of the liberal agent‖).
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people and states had only the most minimal obligations to one
another and the primary motivation for both persons and states
was self-preservation.21 The law of nations was like the law of
nature—both operated in the absence of centralized enforcement authority.22
Drawing from natural law sources, realist theory developed
at the beginning of the twentieth century posited that states
have at their core an interest in self-preservation and the expansion of power.23 A state‘s interests may change over time
and the methods of power may also evolve, but a state‘s behavior will be determined by how it perceives its interests and its
ability to exercise power.24 Structural realism focuses in particular on how the structure of the international system causes
states to pursue power.25
Both the traditional and structural variants of realism emphasize the unitary nature of the state, an entity with its own
interests and motivations in international relations. Realism
21. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin
Classics 1985) (1651) (explaining that the basic right of nature ―is the Liberty
each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation
of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing
any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be
the aptest means thereunto‖).
22. Id. at 394 (―[T]he Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same
thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his
People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own
Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign
Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice,
but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes,
(such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of
Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings,
are Lawes.‖).
23. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 5 (2d ed. 1954)
(explaining the main principle of political realism as ―the concept of interest
defined in terms of power‖). John Mearsheimer explains his theory of ―offensive realism,‖ which emphasizes that great powers ―look for opportunities to
gain power at each others‘ expense.‖ MEARSHEIMER, supra note 12, at 5. The
status quo is unstable ―because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the
costs. A state‘s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.‖ Id. at 21.
24. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 8–9.
25. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 81–99 (1979) (―The concept of structure is based on the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes.‖).
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takes states as the units of international politics and emphasizes their essential similarity, rather than their internal differences.26 As John J. Mearsheimer has noted, realist theory
―tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls.‖27 It assesses interests at the state level, as opposed to as an aggregation of preferences by individuals and entities within the state.
These state interests are largely defined by the international
situation that states face—i.e. anarchy, threats to security and
dominance, and the mutual interest in cooperation.28
In the realist view of international relations, international
law has little role in explaining the behavior of states.29 Realists have rejected the ―legalistic-moralistic‖ approach, suggesting instead that states create and comply with international
law when it serves their particular interests and not because of
legal or moral obligations.30 International law reflects the interests of powerful states and therefore the underlying balance
of power between states.31 Without centralized enforcement,
state compliance with international law is a function of selfinterest, rather than legal obligation.

26. See id. at 93–96 (emphasizing that states are the primary actors in
the international sphere and that although varying in size and power, ―[s]tates
are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform
them. The differences are of capability, not of function‖). Waltz argues that
―[i]n defining international-political structures we take states with whatever
traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may
have. . . . We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities.‖
Id. at 99.
27. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 12.
28. See, e.g., id. at 10 (arguing that offensive realism ―assumes that the
international system strongly shapes the behavior of states. Structural factors
such as anarchy and the distribution of power . . . are what matter most for
explaining international politics‖).
29. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 207–08 (explaining how realists denied the relevance of international law in a realm governed by power
and diplomacy).
30. See GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900–1950, at 95 (1951)
(discussing the ―legalistic-moralistic approach‖); MORGENTHAU, supra note 23,
at 10–11 (noting that political realism ―maintains the autonomy of the political sphere‖ from the moral sphere and taking issue with the ―‗legalisticmoralistic approach‘ to international politics‖).
31. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 15–16 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (observing that ―[d]ominant actors may explicitly
use a combination of sanctions and incentives to compel other actors to act in
conformity with a particular set of principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures‖).
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It is unsurprising then, perhaps, that realism has had few
proponents among international legal scholars.32 As realism,
and in particular structural realism, questions the importance
and relevance of international law, international legal theory
has often proceeded along different lines.33 Recent work in international law, however, has leveraged realist international
relations theory into international law by using rational choice
theory. Rational choice theory posits a model of individuals who
are rationally self-interested and make choices based on their
interests and well-being.34 Similarly, states behave rationally
when they pursue what is in their highest interest.35
Describing international law through a rational choice
model, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner explain a state‘s interests as the ―state‘s preferences about outcomes.‖36 They argue
that a state ―can make coherent decisions based upon identifiable preferences, or interests, and it is natural and common to
explain state action on the international plane in terms of the
primary goal or goals the state seeks to achieve.‖37 Goldsmith
and Posner thus take the state as a unitary actor that can formulate goals and interests and work to actualize them through
international law.
In part, rational choice approaches arise as a reaction and
critique of the predominant view in international law scholarship that states can, should, and do comply with international
law for non-instrumental reasons.38 Rational choice theorists
32. See generally MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 57–98 (2008) (providing a helpful history of compliance theory);
Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1792
(2003) (explaining the relationship between realism and international law
scholarship and noting that ―[ l]iberal international law scholars, dismissed by
realists as hopelessly naïve, generally respond by ignoring or rejecting realist
critiques‖).
33. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT‘L L. 335, 337–38 (1989).
34. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Introduction to RATIONAL CHOICE 4 (Jon Elster
ed., 1986) (explaining that to act rationally ―means to choose the highestranked element in the feasible set‖ of alternatives).
35. See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008) (―States are assumed to be rational, selfinterested, and able to identify and pursue their interests. . . . States do not
concern themselves with the welfare of other states but instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs.‖).
36. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 14 –16.
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reject the idea that states have a moral obligation to follow international law, separate from any rational interest they have
in creating or complying with international law.39 At least they
predict that states may have an interest in complying with international law, but it will be for some reason other than a propensity to comply with international law.40 Thus, they explain
compliance largely along realist lines—states comply when it
serves their interests, broadly conceived, but not because of the
independent pull of legal obligation.
Rational choice theory, however, does not always support
realist conclusions about international law. For example, Andrew Guzman applies rational choice theory from an institutionalist perspective. He explains how concerns for reputation can
provide incentives for states to comply with international legal
rules.41 A state will factor its reputation for compliance with international agreements into the costs and benefits of deciding
whether to comply.42 ―Because international law increases the
costs of a violation, it puts a thumb on the scale in favor of
compliance or, as is sometimes said, generates ‗compliance
pull.‘‖43
Although Guzman and Goldsmith and Posner disagree
about the effects of international law and state behavior, they
model the state as a unitary entity whose preferences and behavior are predicted with reference to the ―state‖ and its interactions with other states.44 Moreover, in the view of rational
choice theory, states have interests and act to pursue them in a
rational way through international law, but ―have no innate

39. See, e.g., id. at 9 (observing that ―preferences for international law
compliance tend to depend on whether such compliance will bring security,
economic growth, and related goods; and that citizens and leaders are willing
to forgo international law compliance when such compliance comes at the cost
of these and other goods‖).
40. Id. at 10.
41. GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 34 –36.
42. Id. at 40– 41 (―When a state is deciding whether to comply, it will take
into account a variety of cost and benefits unrelated to law—domestic interests, political relations with other states, and so on—but it will also consider
the legal implications of a violation.‖).
43. Id. at 41.
44. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 5 (―Both ordinary language
and history suggest that states have agency and thus can be said to make decisions and act on the basis of identifiable goals.‖); GUZMAN, supra note 35, at
19 (explaining the reasoning for adopting an assumption of a unitary state in
his rational choice theory).
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preference for complying with international law.‖45 States seek
to maximize their own welfare and ultimately act based on political cost-benefit considerations with regard to international
law.
2. Responding to Realism
Although realism remains a dominant perspective in international relations, there are a number of competing theories
that attempt to demonstrate the relevance of international institutions and define the international sphere through institutional and social constructs. These theories create more space
for international law, but like realism, they begin from a unitary state perspective that takes the state as the unit of international relations.
For example, Alexander Wendt, constructivism‘s leading
proponent, explains that the identities and interests of states
are constructed by shared ideas, rather than, as realists maintain, given by nature or determined by forces such as power or
dominance.46 Constructivism asserts that states can go beyond
self-interest and act in ways that promote the collective interest.47 Yet Wendt retains the state as the primary unit of analysis and treats states as intentional or purposive actors.48 Although non-state actors may increasingly affect and constrain
states, ―system change ultimately happens through states‖ and

45. GUZMAN, supra note 35.
46. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT‘L ORG. 391, 396 (1992).
47. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
242– 43 (1999) (explaining that states see themselves as part of a ―‗society of
states‘ whose norms they adhere to not because of on-going self-interested calculations that it is good for them as individual states, but because they have
internalized and identify with them. This is not to deny that states are selfinterested in much of what they do within the boundaries of that society. But
with respect to many of the fundamental questions of their co-existence states
have already achieved a level of collective interest that goes well beyond
‗Realism‘‖).
48. Alexander Wendt, The State as Person in International Theory, 30
REV. INT‘L STUD. 289, 291 (2004).
To say that states are ‗actors‘ or ‗persons‘ is to attribute to them properties we associate first with human beings—rationality, identities,
interests, beliefs, and so on. Such attributions . . . are found in the
work of realists, liberals, institutionalists, Marxists, constructivists,
behaviouralists, feminists, postmodernists, international lawyers, and
almost everyone in between. To be sure, scholars disagree about
which properties of persons should be ascribed to states . . . .
Id. at 289 (footnote omitted).
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―[i]n that sense states are still at the center of the international
system.‖49
Institutionalists pose another response to realism by focusing on how states can cooperate through international institutions. Robert Keohane argues that states ―build international
regimes in order to promote mutually beneficial cooperation‖
and that such regimes ―reduce transaction costs for states, alleviate problems of asymmetrical information, and limit the degree of uncertainty that members of the regime face in evaluating each others‘ policies.‖50 Keohane, however, starts from the
same assumption of unitary, self-interested states put forth by
realists.51 Although Keohane does not focus on international
law, his approach focuses on international institutions that are
often ―creatures of international law,‖ and his work has been
imported into international legal discourse.52
In political theory, scholars have reacted to realism by positing cosmopolitan duties of states to protect human rights
and meet other global responsibilities.53 Cosmopolitanism
adopts a moral point of view that relates to global concern for
the well-being of all persons, regardless of nationality.54
Charles R. Beitz, a foremost cosmopolitan theorist, rejects realist skepticism about the possibility of moral judgments in international relations.
Although cosmopolitan theory sometimes places responsibility on individuals, a number of theories have shifted attention to institutions and focus on states and national govern49. WENDT, supra note 47, at 9.
50. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY xi (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2005).
51. Id. at 25.
52. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International
Law, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 64, 79–80 (2006) (discussing Keohane‘s impact on
―subsequent analyses of the relationship between international law and
power‖).
53. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 6 (1979) (arguing for the possibility of a normative political theory
of international relations and the ―plausibility of a more cosmopolitan and less
state-centered perspective‖).
54. See id. at 55 (―It is the rights and interests of persons that are of fundamental importance from the moral point of view, and it is to these considerations that the justification of principles for international relations should appeal.‖); TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 274
(1983) (―The essential element of cosmopolitan justice in the circumstances of
the states system is the idea of an international minimum standard to be observed by states in their treatment of individuals, regardless of whether these
are their own nationals or those of another country.‖).
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ments as the locus of cosmopolitan moral obligations.55 Even if
individuals fail in their moral obligations, states can help individuals realize their obligations.56 In addition, states have
unique responsibilities of their own apart from people who
make up the state.57 In this cosmopolitan view, the state is, or
at least has the capacity to be, a moral agent.58
Constructivism, institutionalism, and cosmopolitanism retain the unitary state model, but all reject to varying degrees
the realist view of what does and should affect state behavior.
Conceptualizing state behavior as socially constructed, institu55. See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2003) (describing the development of an institutional turn in cosmopolitan theory).
56. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687, 697–98 (1988)
(arguing that institutions, including states, enable individuals to meet global
responsibilities at lower a cost).
57. Michael J. Green argues that institutional agents are ―different kinds
of agents than individuals are‖ and that ―there is a distinctive set of institutional responsibilities that are structurally different from individual responsibilities.‖ Michael J. Green, Institutional Responsibility for Global Problems, 30
PHIL. TOPICS 79, 86–88 (2002). These responsibilities may include dealing
with ―global problems.‖ Id. at 89.
Part of the reason for the institutional move is to allow the state to
overcome limitations on individual morality. See, e.g., Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 599 (1983) (―[A]
state may demand more of its people than its people, as individuals, must demand of themselves when cosmopolitan goals require sacrifices of them.‖);
Green, supra, at 90. The basic idea is that where individuals may be limited
by self-interest and lack of capacity to tackle social or global problems, states
have the ability and responsibility to address such problems. See IRIS MARION
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 250 (2000) (―Obligations of social justice
are not primarily owed by individuals to individuals. Instead, they concern
primarily the organization of institutions.‖).
58. This cosmopolitan view is not just academic. In its strongest form,
doctrines such as responsibility to protect (R2P) posit the duty of states to protect people in other states from genocide, ethnic cleansing and the like, by military means if necessary, even when such efforts have little to do with the
state‘s self-interest. See, e.g., INT‘L COMM‘N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶ 1.35 (Dec. 2001), available at
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (stating that sovereignty implies responsibility to one‘s citizens). The doctrine of R2P means that
states have responsibilities to protect their own citizens and people and also
have a responsibility to people in other states. See Carla Bagnoli, Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, NOMOS XLVII 117, 130 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams
eds., 2006) (―It follows from it that neutrality is morally inadmissible, that the
decision not to intervene calls for blame and other moral sanctions. The perfect duty to coerce the offender is complementary to the perfect duty to protect
the victim.‖); Neomi Rao, The Unbearable Lightness of Responsibility to Protect
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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tional, or moral creates a potentially important role for international law.
3. Limits of Unitary Actor Theories
Despite their serious disagreements about the nature of
the state and how it should respond to international law, unitary-actor theories start from the same foundational assumption
about the state as a single institution. Modeling the state as a
unitary actor in international law leads theorists to two important conclusions.
First, the state should be treated as if it were a unitary actor in international relations—a black box undifferentiated by
its internal processes. These theories do not deny that domestic
processes might affect state decisions and even in some instances determine state decisions, but nonetheless, they use a
simplifying assumption that sub-state actors are ultimately
less important than the ―state‖ for making predictions about international behavior.
Second, as a unitary actor, the state can formulate its interests in a coherent manner. It allows the attribution of various interests and goals to the state, rather than to the messy
collectivity of individuals and institutions that comprise the
state. This may be the greatest attraction of the unitary-actor
assumption—states can behave in predictable ways because
they are, for all relevant purposes, a single institution in the
sphere of international law.
Yet unitary theories leave largely unanswered the questions about how states formulate their interests.59 The public
choice analysis highlights some of the limitations of unitary
state theories by demonstrating the pervasive disaggregation of
interests and incentives within the executive branch, the
branch most likely to control state action in a unitary manner.
Public choice may also be complementary to some unitary theories, particularly rational choice theories, because it provides
information about the domestic processes that generate state
interests and shape the form of international law compliance.60
59. See infra Part IV.A.
60. See infra Part IV.A; see also GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (explaining
how liberal approaches that are similar to public-choice analysis can be reconciled with rational choice approach because ―[o]nce the domestic political
process plays itself out, however, the state may pursue those policy goals on
the international stage in a rational and unitary way. From this perspective,
the liberal model serves as an input for the institutionalist model‖).
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B. LIBERAL APPROACHES: DISAGGREGATING THE STATE
In recent years, scholars have challenged the model of unitary states acting within the international system and proposed
instead a liberal account of international relations that disaggregates the state. This work has looked inside the ―black box‖
of the unitary state and considered how domestic processes,
pressures, interests, and institutions affect foreign policy. ―Liberal theory rests on a ‗bottom-up‘ view of politics in which the
demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics.‖61 State preferences represent subsets
of domestic society and powerful interest groups, and the configuration of state preferences determines state behavior in international relations.62
In international law, liberal scholars have focused on
transnational cooperation and non-state actors working together. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter explains that the nation-state ―is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.‖63 In this view, the traditional model of the unitary
state in international law does not explain the activity at the
ground level, where many different actors, both in government
and outside of it, effectively pursue foreign policy. Slaughter
calls into question the idea of the unitary state and notes that
this ―fiction of a unitary will and capacity for action‖ blinds us
from seeing the international system as it really is.64
Contrary to the dominant unitary perspective, Slaughter
argues, international regulation across borders occurs through
a ―disaggregated state‖ of many semi-autonomous institutions
that have the power and authority to fulfill their mandates and
interact with similar institutions in other countries.65 Govern61. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 INT‘L ORG. 513, 517 (1997); see also Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT‘L ORG. 427, 433–35 (1988) (modeling international relations as a two-level
game in which international negotiations take place on both the international
and domestic levels, and to succeed negotiators have to find a winning solution
to both games simultaneously).
62. Moravcsik, supra note 61, at 519–20.
63. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF.
183, 184 (1997) (―These parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and
even legislatures—are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a
dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order.‖).
64. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12–13 (2004).
65. Id.; see also Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1285 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
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ment officials regularly form networks with their counterparts
in other countries to develop transgovernmental policy.66 Kal
Raustiala has identified detailed case studies of the transgovernmental networks at work in regulatory areas such as securities, antitrust, and the environment.67 Importantly, Slaughter
posits that transnational networks can improve compliance
with international law.68
Focused more specifically on international law compliance,
Harold Koh recognizes a similar phenomenon in his work on
the ―transnational legal process,‖ which describes ―how public
and private actors . . . interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.‖69
He offers this process as a theory about why nations comply
with international law most of the time.70 He argues that nations do so because through a ―repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalization—the transnational legal
process—international law acquires its ‗stickiness,‘ and nations
come to ‗obey‘ out of a perceived self-interest that becomes institutional habit.‖71 This transnational legal process similarly
focuses on a disaggregated state. It highlights a complicated
WORLD ORDER (2004)) (noting that a significant assumption behind Slaughter‘s work is that disaggregated actors have the legal power and authority to
enter into cross-border relations and that this power also provides evidence for
the existence of a disaggregated state).
66. Slaughter, supra note 63, at 189–90 (―Bureaucrats charged with the
administration of antitrust policy, securities regulation, environmental policy,
criminal law enforcement, banking and insurance supervision—in short, all
the agents of the modern regulatory state—regularly collaborate with their
foreign counterparts.‖).
67. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J.
INT‘L L. 1, 26– 49 (2002) (discussing networks in securities regulation, competition policy, and environmental regulations).
68. Id. at 7 (explaining that national governments would exercise ―their
national authority to implement their transgovernmental and international
obligations and represent[ ] the interests of their country while working with
their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distill information, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmonizing
national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems‖).
69. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational
Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996).
70. Id. at 206 (―[A] theory of transnational legal process has . . . explanatory power regarding questions of causation. It predicts that nations will come
into compliance with international norms . . . .‖).
71. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 655 (1998).
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array of governmental and non-governmental actors working
together across borders to create and to ensure compliance with
international law.72
For Koh, nations follow legal norms because ―domestic decision-making becomes ‗enmeshed‘ with international legal
norms, as institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of an international commitment become entrenched in
domestic legal and political processes.‖73 Koh does not, however, provide a detailed mechanism for how such entrenchment
occurs, but rather proposes it as a theory of the way government actors behave.74
Even more than Slaughter, Koh stresses the normativity of
his arguments. Koh argues that the transnational legal process
promotes obedience to, or compliance with, international law or
international law norms, which he assumes is a positive good.75
Koh‘s theory stresses the ability of both sub-state and private
actors to influence government action in the direction of compliance with international law.76 Thus, the disaggregated state
is normatively desirable to the extent that it promotes compliance with international law.
From the description of domestic and transnational cooperation, that is non-state activity, however, Slaughter and Koh
have drawn conclusions about state behavior—namely that
there will be greater compliance with international law and development of more precise norms of international law.77
Slaughter and Koh focus on how disaggregated actors work
72. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 69, at 207 (noting that nongovernmental organizations ―are not just observers of, but important players in, transnational
legal process‖).
73. Id. at 204.
74. See Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797, 801 (2005) (criticizing the work of Koh and Slaughter
because ―one cannot derive from their discussions any clear predictions about
how and when nonstate actors cause compliance with international law or
generate other forms of international cooperation‖).
75. Koh, supra note 69, at 204 –05 (explaining that the ―critical idea is the
normativity of transnational legal process‖ in that ―[t]o survive in an interdependent world [all nations] . . . must eventually interact with other nations‖
and accordingly internalize international legal norms).
76. Id. at 207.
77. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 213 (―Government networks also
strengthen compliance with international rules and norms, both through vertical enforcement and information networks and by building governance capacity in countries that have the will but not the means to comply.‖); see also id.
at 214–15 (noting that government networks ―can harness the coercive power of
national government officials‖ in addition to other forms of ―soft power‖).
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transnationally and conclude that this fosters international cooperation and soft forms of international law.78 They posit that
liberal approaches demonstrate the relevance of international
law and predict an increase in state compliance with international law.79 This prediction, however, does not follow necessarily from the increase in non-state activities—at least it is not
clear how the proliferation of non-state international cooperation and dialogue will improve the creation of, and compliance,
with international law by states.
C. BRINGING TOGETHER THE ―THEY‖ AND THE ―IT‖
Unitary theories recognize that domestic factors may influence state behavior, yet generally exclude these factors from
their theories. Similarly, liberal approaches focused on domestic actors minimize or fail to take account of institutions that
formulate the state‘s view. Liberal theorists acknowledge that
the state often acts in a unitary manner, but do not provide an
account of how domestic factors affect the behavior of a state
qua state.
By contrast, public choice considers how the ―they‖ of the
executive branch seeks to function as an ―it‖ with regard to international law. In doing so, it follows suggestions in the political science literature that unitary and domestic approaches can
be complementary. For example, Andrew Moravcsik, a proponent of liberalism in international relations, has suggested that
liberal theories can provide the first step in a two-stage process
of explaining state behavior. First, liberal theories can help explain how states define their preferences; and second, state interactions on the international level may be explained by realist and institutionalist theories of strategic interaction.80
Similarly, Helen V. Milner has modeled the preferences of domestic agents and how they are brought together institutionally in order to systematically study the domestic influences on
international politics.81
78. Id. at 261 (―[G]overnment networks promote convergence, compliance
with international agreements, and improved cooperation among nations on a
wide range of regulatory and judicial issues.‖).
79. Id. (―A world order self-consciously created out of horizontal and vertical government networks could go much further. It could create a genuine
global rule of law . . . .‖).
80. Moravcsik, supra note 61, at 544.
81. See HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION:
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 97, 234 (1997) (―Three
internal factors condition a state‘s ability to cooperate: the structure of domes-
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This Article proposes a similar two-step process to explain
aspects of international law compliance within the executive
branch. Like liberal theories, the public choice analysis of international law compliance focuses on variation in domestic
politics—specifically the preferences and interests of key actors
and agencies who interpret international law and make decisions about compliance within the executive branch. Yet, like
state-centered theories, public choice examines the available
institutional mechanisms within the executive branch for coordination of interests.
D. THE CENTRALITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
This Article considers behavior of officials in the executive
branch because of the central role that the President plays with
respect to the interpretation of and compliance with international law. As seen above, many theories of international law
compliance focus either explicitly or implicitly on the activities
of the executive. Unitary-state theories find their best case for
unitary action in the executive.82 Liberal theories focus on a
wide array of government and nongovernment actors, but many
of the transnational activities they describe relate to the work
of executive branch agencies, precisely because they are most
likely to engage their foreign counterparts.
With international law, as with foreign affairs more generally, the President has a natural advantage in serving as the
point of national unity. Speaking with ―one voice‖ on international matters is often advanced as an essential component of
strengthening state power, because it does not display indecision, internal division, or weakness to other nations.83 Moreover, as a practical matter, analyzing the executive branch allows for study over a more manageable part of the federal
tic preferences, the nature of domestic political institutions, and the distribution of information internally. . . . [T]hese aspects of the domestic game combined with the international game determine whether cooperation is possible
and what its terms will be.‖).
82. Those who adopt a unitary theory recognize the different components
of the government, but nonetheless treat it as a unitary entity for the purposes
of modeling its behavior with regard to international law and foreign affairs.
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing their assumption that state interests are pegged to the state‘s political leadership); infra
notes 265–75 and accompanying text.
83. The Founders recognized the need for a central authority in the realm
of foreign affairs. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 213 (James Madison)
(Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (―If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly
ought to be in respect to other nations.‖).
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government. Even in the most unitary branch, we can see the
divergence of agency interests and the difficulty of institutional
coordination. Public choice problems only multiply when considering the role of Congress, the Supreme Court, and private
actors.
Focus on the executive branch in this Article, however,
should not be taken to undermine the importance of all three
branches to foreign policy and international law interpretation.
Despite the interest in projecting a unitary face abroad, the
Constitution divides the foreign affairs power—as it does the
domestic powers—between the three branches.84 This separation is often overlooked or minimized in the context of international policy.85 Congress and the Supreme Court have important constitutional roles with respect to international law.86
84. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION‘S TEXT IN FOREIGN AF8 (2007) (arguing that the interest in speaking with ―one voice‖ is a policy preference and one that is ―fundamentally opposed to the constitutional design‖). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762 passim (2009) (providing a
thorough treatment of the textual and historical understanding of the constitutional powers of the three branches in foreign affairs).
85. RAMSEY, supra note 84, at 379–80 (explaining that his textual account
of the Constitution‘s text in foreign affairs closely resembles the ―standard description of constitutional government in domestic affairs‖); see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 13 (noting that in domestic affairs ―[w]e do not choose to
screen out everything except what the president does or says, or what Congress does or says, or what the Supreme Court does or says. But effectively, in
the international system, we do‖).
86. The Constitution gives Congress authority to define and punish ―Offences against the Law of Nations.‖ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. This power
gives Congress a significant role in formulating customary international law.
See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 447, 452 (2000) (―An analysis of the Clause supports the conclusion that
the framers delegated extraordinary foreign affairs powers to Congress, far
broader than those granted on the domestic front.‖); see also Paulsen, supra
note 84, at 1809 (―Given international law‘s fogginess and (in part) common
law nature, Congress possesses in effect a common-law-making power to pass
criminal laws concerning matters it decides are a violation of the Law of Nations.‖). Congress also participates in the formation of international agreements, including treaties requiring the support of two-thirds of the Senate,
and may enact statutes to implement treaty obligations. See Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV.
961, 962 (2001) (discussing the difference between treaties and executive
agreements).
Along with the political branches, the judiciary interprets and ensures
compliance with international law as an ordinary incidence of its duty to decide cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Paulsen, supra
note 84, at 1816–17 (2009) (explaining that international law may be invoked
in U.S. courts just as domestic law and there is no ―‗foreign affairs exception‘
FAIRS
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Precisely what the allocation of constitutional powers is with
regard to foreign affairs has been the subject of much dispute,
and the branches may conflict in the pursuit of their aims.87
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to highlight that
the U.S. Constitution provides for separation of powers over
foreign affairs, including the mechanisms for interpreting and
complying with international law.
Nonetheless, over time the President has consolidated
power over foreign policy. With regard to international law, the
President plays a central, though not exclusive, role in its formation, interpretation, and compliance. The Constitution gives
the President authority to represent the United States in its interactions with other nations and to create international law by
negotiating treaties and other agreements with foreign powers.88 As Commander-in-Chief of the nation‘s military, the President leads the conduct of war, which provides a significant
source of authority to interpret the obligations of the law of
war.89 Many have argued that executive power has been at its
height since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
to the power of American courts to decide questions of international law or of
U.S. law that draw upon norms of international law‖). Although the Court has
sometimes deferred to the political branches in foreign affairs, see, e.g., United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936) (discussing
the broad power of the President over foreign affairs), it has often directly engaged in deciding difficult issues regarding the domestic effects of international law, see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–27 (2008) (holding, in one part
of the opinion, that certain non-self-executing treaties do not give the President the power to make them self-executing).
87. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–
1957 (4th ed. 1957) (―[T]he Constitution . . . is an invitation to struggle for the
privilege of direct[ing] American foreign policy.‖); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 25 (2d ed. 1996) (―Whether
one finds the mantle of national authority over foreign relations buried in the
Constitution or more or less outside it, separation and checks and balances
govern the conduct of foreign affairs also, but here they look different, have
different consequences, raise different issues.‖); RAMSEY, supra note 84, at 8
(―The Constitution deliberately fosters multiple voices in foreign affairs, as it
fosters multiple voices in domestic affairs.‖).
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Article II also gives the President the
power to ―appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.‖ Id. The
President ―shall receive Ambassadors and other public ministers.‖ Id. at art. 2,
§ 3. These explicit grants of power have often been interpreted to give the
President the power to recognize governments, modify relationships with governments, and determine the contents of communications with foreign governments. See HENKIN, supra note 87, at 36–38 (discussing the foreign affairs
powers of the President).
89. HENKIN, supra note 87, at 45–50 (describing the President‘s powers as
Commander-in-Chief ).
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Questions about the scope and applicability of international law arise during the course of all manners of executive
branch activities including trade, financial regulation, and environmental policy. Lawyers within the various agencies must
determine the applicability of international law. In the process
of executing domestic laws, the President must decide to what
extent and in what manner international law affects how he
proceeds with his work.90 Such on-the-ground determinations
will largely be confined to the executive branch and most of
these questions will never be reviewed in court.91
Moreover, even after determining that international law
applies to a contemplated action, the President may have, in
certain circumstances, the authority to disregard international
law.92 This may include the unilateral authority to terminate
treaties.93 To varying degrees, it is thought that the President
90. See Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1812 (―If the Constitution‘s grant of ‗the
executive power‘ is rightly understood as embracing the power to determine
and direct the content of the United States‘ policies with respect to relations
with other nations, this is truly an enormous sphere of constitutional power
within which the President possesses authority to interpret the obligations of
international law for the United States.‖); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619
F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of reh‘g en
banc) (explaining that ―international-law norms are not domestic U.S. law in the
absence of action by the political branches to codify those norms‖ and ―[t]o the
extent there is ambiguity in a statutory grant to the President of war-making
authority, the President . . . is to resolve the ambiguity in the first instance‖).
91. Questions about the scope of executive branch behavior may stay out
of the court for any number of reasons, including secrecy of some actions, the
difficulty of finding an appropriate plaintiff with standing, and the possibility
that courts will decline to review ―political‖ questions. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47 (D.D.C. 2010) (determining the political question doctrine barred judicial consideration of an injunction prohibiting the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi in part because ―there are no judicially manageable standards by which courts can endeavor to assess the President‘s
interpretation of military intelligence and his resulting decision based on that
intelligence—whether to use military force against a terrorist target overseas‖).
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 reporters‘ note 3 (1987) (―[T]he President has the power,
when acting within his constitutional authority, to disregard a rule of international law or an agreement of the United States . . . .‖); cf. Michael J. Glennon,
Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by
the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 325 (1985) (arguing
that ―[w]hen Congress approves of a presidential act violative of a customary
international law, that act is constitutionally permissible‖).
93. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); see also Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1778 (explaining that if the President‘s ―executive power includes the power over foreign affairs . . . , a treaty may not extinguish or limit
such constitutional power‖ (footnote omitted)).
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may disregard international law when it conflicts with constitutional requirements.94 The extent to which the President may
disregard international law in a particular circumstance, however, will depend on legal analysis, but also on security, military, diplomatic, and political considerations.95 In sum, the
President‘s grant of executive power gives him significant,
though by no means exclusive, authority to determine the extent and manner of United States compliance with international law.
E. THE ―SOFTNESS‖ OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before turning to the public choice of international law
compliance, it is important to take into account some particular
characteristics of international law. Compliance with international law is complicated because (1) there are different levels
of domestic obligation associated with various forms of international law; and (2) international law has varying degrees of
―softness‖ that invite policy judgments and allow a wide range
of plausible interpretations.
At the outset, there are different types of international law
that have different domestic effects in the United States. There
is widespread agreement that statutes incorporating international law and self-executing treaties can be enforced domestically.96 The President interprets treaty obligations in the first
instance and courts generally defer to executive interpretation
when treaties are ambiguous.97
94. See generally HENKIN, supra note 87, at 241– 45 (explaining that the
President ―has independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs as Executive, as treaty-maker, as ‗sole organ,‘ and as Commander in Chief. Under
these powers, the President can act in ways that make or affect law in the
United States, and it may be that as far as the Constitution is concerned he
can exercise these powers even in ways that are inconsistent with U.S. international obligations‖); Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1812–16 (―[T]he President
has the largely discretionary power to adopt, interpret, and apply principles of
internal law, as he thinks most proper, as an aspect of the Article II ‗executive
Power‘ with respect to foreign affairs and as an aspect of his power as the military‘s Commander in Chief.‖).
95. Jack Goldsmith has observed that the President ―could in theory reverse any OLC decision and set legal policy for the executive branch.‖
GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 79.
96. See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 –05 (2008); John F.
Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L.
655 (2010).
97. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,
41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 960–63 (1994); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1211–12 (2007) (arguing
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Other forms of international law, such as non-selfexecuting treaties or customary international law, have international effect, but their domestic effect remains in dispute.
There is a robust and ongoing debate about what is legitimately
included within this area of law and whether and to what degree it is binding on the President.98 Some maintain that customary international law is part of federal general common
law, enforceable by U.S. courts, but this position has been seriously contested in recent years.99 As far as the executive
branch is concerned, such law is not binding,100 although it may
deserve respect and the President may use such law when making decisions relating to foreign affairs and military preparedness. Customary international law poses particular problems of
interpretation, especially as it has expanded away from traditional forms and toward new categories not firmly rooted in actual state practice.101
In addition to questions about enforceability, international
law exhibits varying degrees of ―softness‖ and differs with respect to its precision, obligation, and enforcement.102 More precise terms, more binding agreements, or better mechanisms for
enforcement produce greater legalization or hardness in international law. Theorists have explained that international law
rarely exhibits significant hardness—instead states routinely
choose forms of legalization that are soft as to precision, obliga-

that ―self-executing treaties and statutes incorporating international law
should be subject to executive interpretation to the extent that they are ambiguous and the executive‘s interpretation is reasonable‖ and that judicial deference has ―significant advantages‖ over allowing courts to interpret ambiguous
treaties).
98. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815, 844 – 46 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense
About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997). The debate continues in the federal judiciary as well, as is evident in such decisions as Al-Bihani v. Obama in
which Judges Brown, Kavanaugh, and Williams exchanged lengthy opinions
over the appropriate use of international law norms for the interpretation of
statutes by the judiciary. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying reh‘g en banc).
99. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98.
100. See, e.g., Auth. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Override Int‘l
Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 168–70 (1989).
101. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 98, at 839– 40.
102. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT‘L ORG. 421, 421–24 (2000).
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tion, and/or enforcement.103 Thus, although one might see precise terms, they will often be coupled with low levels of enforceability; or, alternatively, an agreement may have open-ended
terms, subject to wide-ranging interpretation, but have relatively strict enforcement mechanisms.104 Similarly, domestic
statutes pertaining to the conduct of foreign affairs may also be
manipulated through interpretations, such as Harold Koh‘s definition of ―hostilities‖ under the War Powers Resolution to not
include drone attacks, aerial piloted attacks, and other military
efforts.105 Moreover, although some traditional rules and doctrines of international law may be well-established, newer
norms of international law may be less determinate, particularly as applied to new circumstances such as the war on terror
and the evolving technologies for fighting it. The variability
and softness of international law encourages interpretations
that combine law with political judgment, making it difficult to
separate the two.106
This short discussion highlights the well-accepted understanding that assessments of international law depend, often to
a significant degree, not only on formal legal interpretation, but
on practical considerations about the effects on foreign and domestic policy.107 Regardless of whether ―harder‖ international
law is desirable, lawyers and officials within the executive
branch treat international law compliance along a continuum
that considers a combination of legal, political, diplomatic, and
national security concerns. In addition, since international law
interpretation is often less settled by courts, the political
branches retain more leeway. The available legitimate or plaus103. See id. at 455–56.
104. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, AnneMarie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT‘L ORG.
401, 404 –08 (2000).
105. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations
Comm., 112th Cong. (June 28, 2011) (written testimony of Harold Hongju Koh,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep‘t of State), http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_
Testimony.pdf (explaining that ―hostilities‖ is an ―ambiguous standard‖ that
does not apply to the armed conflict in Libya); Savage, supra note 8.
106. See Abbott et al., supra note 104, at 419 (―Law and politics are intertwined at all levels of legalization . . . . [ I]t is reasonable to assume that most of
the time, legal and political considerations combine to influence behavior.‖).
107. A number of former State Department legal advisers ―acknowledged
that where international law is unsettled or legitimately open to differing interpretations, they would naturally favor the interpretation most consonant
with the course of action advocated by policy-makers.‖ SCHARF & WILLIAMS,
supra note 11, at 205.
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ible interpretations allow for a range of policies that might be
compliant with international law.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMPLIANCE
This Part will explain what I call the public choice of international law compliance. By this I mean describing and evaluating how officials and agencies within the executive branch
interpret international law and make decisions about compliance. The emphasis here is on key domestic processes that
determine compliance with international law. Pulling apart the
interests, incentives, preferences, and approaches of different
agencies and entities reveals an executive often at odds with
itself. The public choice analysis demonstrates how the executive branch is a ―they‖ and not an ―it‖ even with regard to foreign affairs and international law compliance.108
Bureaucratic competition and the difficulty of presidential
control have been examined in the domestic context109 and also
with respect to international relations,110 but nonetheless these
observations play surprisingly little role in how theorists evaluate state compliance with international law. The public
choice analysis applies these tools to the agencies responsible
for questions of international law compliance. Foreign policy
emerges out of a process that involves many different agencies
and individuals who act in part based on their particular interests, concerns, and agendas, and often will have divergent or
conflicting interests and preferences with regard to how the
state pursues foreign policy within the framework of international law.111 These actors work out their differences in a man108. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 49 n.5 (citing sources
where this observation has been made in the context of the administrative
state and also for Congress); see also Putnam, supra note 61, at 432 (―If the
term ‗state‘ is to be used to mean ‗central decision-makers,‘ we should treat it
as a plural noun: not ‗the state, it . . . ‘ but ‗the state, they . . . .‘‖).
109. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 257–76 (1st ed. 1989).
110. See GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 143–98, 255–93 (2d ed. 1999).
111. The political science literature offers further insight into the question
of how domestic politics influences foreign policy and international relations,
although this literature is not particularly concerned with international law
compliance. See, e.g., ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 110, at 113; Putnam,
supra note 61, at 460 (―Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach
recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the ‗national interest‘ requires.‖); Steven B. Redd, The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strate-
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ner that is often ill-defined and haphazard. Even when the
state must act in a centralized manner, key decision makers
frequently divide over what action to take. The resolution of
differences in this process does not necessarily proceed in a linear or coordinated manner.
Thus, the public choice analysis of executive branch action
fills a critical gap between unitary state theories and explanations of the state as disaggregated in international law. Like
disaggregated theories, the public choice account looks inside
the ―black box‖ to study various actors. Like unitary theories, it
also looks at institutional mechanisms for coordinating agency
interests in the formation of ―state‖ interests.
This Part first provides a brief overview of some of the basic tenets of public choice theory, including some applications of
these insights to international law. Then I examine international law compliance in the executive branch of the United
States through a public choice framework by describing the key
legal offices that determine the interpretation and scope of international law. For each agency, I examine and explain its operating structure; its culture, including the agency‘s self-image
as well as its external image; its incentives with regard to international law interpretation and compliance; and finally its
relationship to the White House and President. This account
provides a richer description of how the executive branch determines whether and how to comply with international law
and considers some of the dynamics that shape decision making
and the attempts to coordinate divergent viewpoints.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Public choice theory provides a richer understanding of collective action within the government, examining in greater detail the incentives and operations of legislatures and bureaucrats with regard to domestic policy and regulation. Public
gies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo, 6 INT‘L STUD. PERSP. 129, 145 (2005) (―The broad policy implication of
this theory and these case study and empirical studies is that leaders will often be constrained by domestic/political considerations above all else.‖).
[ I ]ndividual decision makers vary in their subjective estimations of
costs and benefits, even when faced with the same information. One
cannot conclude therefore, that regardless of who had been sitting in
the White House, he or she would have also decided to use force given
identical military, economic, and political conditions.
Alex Mintz, The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 595, 614 (1993) (citations omitted).
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choice starts from an assumption that collective entities do not
make decisions, but instead are comprised of individuals who
make decisions based on advancing their rational interests.112
Broadly speaking, public choice analysis focuses on political
dynamics in order to try to explain the outcomes of the political
or bureaucratic process.113
In studying these dynamics, public choice theory looks at
the incentives and preferences of individuals within an organization in order to understand how the institution works. ―Public choice helps to illuminate the ways in which specific institutional actors—flesh-and-blood legislators, judges, and
bureaucrats—interact, and how differing institutions operate
individually and in combination.‖114 ―Public choice‖ refers to a
number of different theories and concepts often given this label.115 The analysis focuses on compromises that must be made
between competing political interests.116
112. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 7–10 (2009) (discussing the assumption of individual rationality); Ronald A. Cass, Introduction: Economics and International
Law, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 36 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds.,
1997).
113. For a more detailed discussion of public choice concepts and their applications, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997);
STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 112.
114. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 112.
115. For example, one branch focuses on interest-group theory and describes the political process as a competition between self-interested individuals and groups, including politicians and special interests. In this view, legislation and regulation generally result from powerful interest groups using
politicians and the political process to improve their welfare, rather than the
general welfare of the public. ―In short, legislation is ‗sold‘ by the legislature
and ‗bought‘ by the beneficiaries of the legislation.‖ William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,
18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 113,
at 12–37; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
Another related branch, sometimes called social choice, studies the
democratic process and suggests not just that it might be a product of special
interests but rather ―that political outcomes will be entirely incoherent and
that the whole concept of the ‗public interest‘ is meaningless.‖ FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 113, at 38; see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 167 (1982) (explaining how the meaning
of social choices is obscure and may simply be the ―accidental amalgamation of
what the manipulators (perhaps unintentionally) happened to produce‖).
116. See Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice
AND
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Of particular relevance to this Article, scholars have offered competing public choice accounts of bureaucratic behavior.117 For example, William Niskanen set forth a principle of
agency expansion—that rational bureaucrats seek to maximize
their budgets and, consequently, their salaries and power.118 By
contrast, James Q. Wilson posited that agencies tend to be risk
averse and will behave in a manner that protects their autonomy, which includes maintaining independence from oversight
by other agencies.119 Wilson examined how the culture of an
agency, including whether it had a strong mission, affects its
behavior, priorities, and ability to adapt to changing circumstances.120 Public choice may not explain the full range of political behavior, but it provides a useful tool for pulling apart the
motivations of individuals who make up government institutions in order to better understand institutional decision making.121
Although currently limited, there has been a growing interest in public choice applications to international law.122
Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 745,
748 (1995) (explaining that public choice theory assumes ―politics must consist
primarily of the effecting of tradeoffs and compromises among competing interests, rather than a solidaristic pursuit of an overarching common goal to
the exclusion of opposing claims‖).
117. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 112, at 342–55 (providing an overview of the various theories of bureaucratic action).
118. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38 (1971).
119. WILSON, supra note 109, at 90–112.
120. James Q. Wilson noted the effects of culture, including that
[f ]irst, tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to
with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are
part of it. Second, organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy will experience serious conflict as defenders of one
seek to dominate representatives of others. Third, organizations will
resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant
culture.
Id. at 101.
121. There is disagreement about whether these positive descriptions
should lead to normative insights about how courts, agencies, and ordinary
people should view the political process and the outputs of that process, and
indeed, what those normative insights should be. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 113, at 42– 47 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
122. See generally Cass, supra note 112, at 1– 4 (describing the potential for
growth in the field of public choice and international law); D. Daniel Sokol,
Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029,
1041– 48 (2011) (reviewing MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC
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Scholars have used public choice theory to explain various aspects of international policy. For example, Enrico Colombatto
and Jonathan R. Macey have explained international insidertrading regulation from the perspective of regulators who found
an international regulatory regime in their interest because it
increased their power and authority.123 Alan O. Sykes and Andrew T. Guzman have analyzed the domestic political incentives
that cause agencies to seek greater regulatory control through
particular international trade regimes.124 Julie Roin has examined factors accounting for the difficulty of international
harmonization of tax policy.125 Public choice analysis in these
areas has focused on specific issues and problems and evaluated the domestic political considerations that drive international policy and cooperation.126 It takes a hard look at the
compromises between competing interests, rather than assuming an ideal of compliance with international law.127
This Part seeks to apply public choice insights to the question of how the executive branch in the United States determines compliance with international law. In international matters, the President represents the state abroad128 and this
provides a certain amount of very important unity. Nonetheless, even the unitary executive is an aggregation of different
individuals, institutions, and interests with respect to international policy. The public choice of international law compliance
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009), criticizing the authors
for their omission of public choice applications to international policy and organizations and stressing the importance of this topic); Stephan, supra note
116, at 767.
123. Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of
International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 951–54 (1996).
124. SeeAndrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J.
883, 906–13 (2002) (explaining that when governments attempt to expand
their laws extraterritorially it leads to global overregulation); Alan O. Sykes,
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991) (discussing
the public choice perspective as it relates to the escape clause of Article XIX).
125. Julie Roin, Taxation with Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61 (2002).
126. Colombatto & Macey, supra note 123, at 932 (―Public choice theory rejects the idea that states have interests, and instead posits that international
institutions are vehicles through which politicians, bureaucrats, and interest
groups reflect their own interests.‖).
127. See Stephan, supra note 116, at 767 (noting that public choice suggests ―appetites more than ideals might dominate the lawmaking process, a
conclusion that is at least dreary if not disillusioning‖).
128. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
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examines the interests and incentives that several key agencies
have with regard to the interpretation and compliance with international law.
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERPRETATION IN THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
This Part identifies several key agencies and actors responsible for decisions about international law interpretation
and application throughout the executive branch. It examines
in greater detail the State Department Legal Adviser, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, and the National Security Legal
Advisor. Each of these offices, and a number of others not considered in detail here,129 play an important role in the interpretation of international law and the formation of foreign policy.
In the case of conflict, however, no agency enjoys a constant supremacy over the others. Moreover, each agency has a particular culture and institutional interests that shape how it provides legal analysis.130 When advising the President or his close
advisors, these agencies and individuals may disagree over how
to interpret and apply international law and thus may compete
for the attention and trust of the President. This occurs despite
the fact that the President appoints the heads of these offices
and retains the ability to remove them from office.
Examining these agencies in greater detail reveals a dynamic of negotiation and competition between them. Each
agency has a specific function and mandate. Agencies also have
their own organizational culture, ―a persistent, patterned way
of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships
within an organization.‖131 Some of these agencies and their legal offices will have a stronger sense of ―mission‖ than other offices and this will affect the way in which they make decisions.
Agencies also have distinct constituencies and interest groups
that monitor and seek to shape agency positions.

129. Other legal offices include intelligence agencies, such as the Central
Intelligence Agency and Department of National Intelligence; litigating divisions of the Department of Justice, including the Solicitor General‘s Office;
White House lawyers, including the Counsel to the President and the General
Counsel of the U.S. Trade Representative; and lawyers within other agencies
specifically focused on international law matters.
130. See WILSON, supra note 109, at 86 (explaining how agency beliefs
shape how an agency performs its tasks).
131. Id. at 91.
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Moreover, the internal dynamics and relationships of each
office or agency help to identify its interests and incentives
with regard to international law interpretation.132 These dynamics include the relationship between the political appointees and career lawyers, as well as the type of career legal staff
generally found in the office, and the dynamics between the legal office and the agency of which it is a part. Finally, each entity will have a particular, and often shifting, relationship to
the White House and will compete to influence centralized decision making. This dynamic of competition on key policy matters
will further affect the manner in which agencies interpret and
apply international law.
This public choice analysis also considers institutions
available for coordination and observes that the executive
branch has no singular process for deciding whether and in
what manner to comply with international law. Instead there
are myriad pathways by which international law considerations
come to bear on centralized decision making. Moreover, because
there are so many providers of international law interpretation,
conflicts over the scope and applicability of international law
frequently arise and these are not consistently coordinated into
a singular state interest.133
This Part provides a more realistic description of how even
centralized executive branch decision making may depend upon
diverse sources of legal interpretation and result from an illdefined process by which issues of international law are raised
and addressed.134 These public choice insights suggest that international law compliance results, at least in part, from the
negotiation and competition between different stakeholders in
the executive branch, rather than from a unitary interest or
purpose.

132. The descriptions of agency behavior are based on published accounts
of former administration officials and other publicly available accounts of how
these offices work and have handled particular policy issues. Some of this material draws from my personal observations as Associate Counsel in the Office
of the Counsel to the President (the White House Counsel‘s Office), as well as
from interviews and conversations with former administration officials who
had responsibility for the interpretation of international law and the formation of foreign policy.
133. See infra Part III.
134. One possibility is that such disaggregation is purposeful and serves the
interests of the President in formulating foreign policy and determining compliance with international law. See infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text.
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1. State Department Legal Adviser
The legal adviser‘s office in the State Department
furnishes advice on all legal issues, domestic and international, arising in the course of the Department‘s work. This includes assisting
Department principals and policy officers in formulating and implementing the foreign policies of the United States, and promoting the
development of international law and its institutions as a fundamental element of those policies.135

The office of the legal adviser (frequently referred to as ―L‖)
primarily provides advice to various offices within the State
Department, but also may have a broader role in overseeing international law related matters in other agencies or the White
House.136
The State Department‘s mission and culture emphasize
diplomacy and relationships with other nations.137 The specific
culture of the legal adviser‘s office values international law and
considers it a positive good for the promotion of human rights
and as a solution to problems of international scope.138 The legal adviser‘s office has a distinct mission with regard to international law—it works to ensure U.S. compliance with international law and seeks to promote international law norms within
the government and abroad.139
Moreover, the legal adviser sometimes considers it essential to engage in international legal diplomacy by promoting
the efforts of international law and the role of the United
States as a supporter of international law. As John B. Bellinger, legal adviser during the George W. Bush Administration,
noted: ―I also wanted to make sure that other countries understood that the United States does take international law se-

135. Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. DEP‘T OF ST., http://www.state.gov/s/l /
( last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
136. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at xix.
137. See Bureau of Resource Management, U.S. DEP‘T OF ST., http://www
.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#/mission ( last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (―Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by
helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world
composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.‖).
138. See Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT‘L L. 633, 680 (1962) (explaining the values and policy interests involved with practicing in the Office
of the Legal Adviser).
139. Id. at 634; see also Office of the Legal Adviser, supra note 135.
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riously. . . . I considered this aspect of the office‘s work to be a
central part of my tenure as Legal Adviser.‖140
The approach of the legal adviser is often referred to in
terms of ―conscience.‖141 ―L‖ upholds international morals and
legal obligations for the government at large. Conscience here
may stem from particular international obligations or simply
wider cosmopolitan principles—a general outlook that persists
across administrations. The norms of ―L‖ may differ from other
agencies also charged with the interpretation of international
law. In the idealistic or symbolic view, compliance with international law may be a kind of moral imperative, the right way
forward for the United States and the world.142
Davis Robinson, legal adviser during the Reagan Administration, noted that his office ―for many years was viewed in the
government at large as the moral conscience of American foreign policy.‖143 Similarly, the current legal adviser, Harold Koh,
has repeatedly written and spoken about the normative and
moral dimensions of international law compliance.144 As Koh
explained in a public lecture, the legal adviser serves not only
as counselor, but also ―as a conscience for the U.S. Government
with regard to international law. The Legal Adviser . . . offers
opinions on both the wisdom and morality of proposed international actions.‖145 The staff attorney-advisers similarly adopt a
perspective of international lawyers who believe in the ―importance and utility of adherence to international rules and

140. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 137.
141. Id. at xix.
142. See Philip Allott, The International Lawyer in Government Service:
Ontology and Deontology, 23 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 13, 23 (2005) (―Like a sailor on dry
land, the ideal international lawyer in government service will have in the
mind‘s eye a more distant horizon, the wonderful possibility of human social
progress beyond the dreadful reality of human social evil.‖).
143. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 206 (quoting interview with
Davis Robinson).
144. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 71, at 680–81 (―Nations obey [international
law] because of people like us—lawyers and citizens who care about international law, who choose not to leave the law at the water‘s edge, who do their
utmost to ‗bring international law home.‘‖).
145. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep‘t of State, Remarks to
the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and
International Law ( Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
139119.htm.
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norms‖ and ―tend to favor [policies] that they believe enhance[]
the stability and coherence of the international legal regime.‖146
Yet most legal advisers speaking about their role also recognize the essentially pragmatic nature of their job—to provide
the best possible legal advice, and if it is not taken, to craft the
best justifications under international law after the fact.147 The
legal adviser, like other administration lawyers, interprets international law against a backdrop of his department‘s policy
goals. As Richard Bilder noted in the 1960s, working in the Legal Adviser‘s office caused one to develop a ―pragmatic or functional approach to international law—a tendency to view that
law less as a body of fixed and unchangeable rules than as a
flexible tool for use in forging real solutions to practical problems of international order.‖148
More recently, Koh has observed that as a government
lawyer his role is to remove illegal options from consideration,
but once that is done, his ―client has a right to choose from the
other options, even those you think are lawful if awful and if
that‘s the choice they make, you have to give it your vigorous
defense.‖149 Koh also explained in his Senate testimony about
the lawfulness of the Libya intervention that reasonable minds
may disagree about the interpretation of the War Powers Resolution, ―[b]ut that should not distract those of us in government
from the most urgent question now facing us, which is not one
of law but of policy.‖150 This pragmatic reality of justifying the
146. Michael K. Young, The Role of the Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. Department of State: Institutional Arrangements and Structural Imperatives,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 133, 139– 40.
147. For example, Michael J. Matheson, former legal adviser under the
George H.W. Bush Administration, explained,
when the decision is made to use force, it‘s important what argument
is made to justify that decision. There are some ways of justifying
that are more consistent with past practices; the Legal Adviser can
have a considerable amount of influence on what arguments are
made, which in turn greatly influences what precedential effect that
use of force might have.
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 165; see also id. at 168 (quoting a former legal adviser during the Reagan Administration, Davis Robinson, who
noted that if involved from the beginning, lawyers can help ―with the fallout
from the use of force—in the Congress, in the press, or wherever it is‖).
148. Bilder, supra note 138; see also Young, supra note 146, at 138 (discussing the practical functions of attorney-advisers).
149. State Department Lawyer Harold H. Koh Urges Lawyers to Stand by
Principles in Politically Charged Environment, ASC BLOG (June 20, 2011)
[ hereinafter Koh, ASC BLOG], http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/state-departmentlawyer-harold-h-koh-urges-lawyers-to-stand-by-principles-in-politically-cha.
150. See Koh, supra note 105, at 13.
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Administration‘s policies and seeking congressional approval
often runs against the more idealistic conscience-based depictions of ―L.‖
The organization of the office reinforces the importance of
international law compliance in the context of State Department policy goals. ―L‖ has about 170 attorney-advisers151 who
are overseen by a very thin political layer—the legal adviser
and one or two special assistants chosen by him. The legal adviser thus must work largely with career lawyers and will not
have any significant opportunity to change the composition of
his office. Lacking any meaningful appointment or removal
power over his staff, the legal adviser will have little capability
to exercise political oversight and control. The legal adviser, as
the sole political appointee, can hardly oversee the work of all
the lawyers directly. Career lawyers will have autonomy and
primary control over all but the most significant matters.
Moreover, ‖L‖ assigns attorney-advisers to specific policy
bureaus of the State Department—which may further invest
staff attorneys in the policy work of the Department. The incentives of these lawyers may over time grow to be aligned with
the policy bureaus they regularly serve.152 The advantage of
this is to create stability and institutional knowledge, but the
structure may cause narrow policy interests to drive legal analysis. This structure also further diminishes the political control
of the legal adviser over his staff.
Within the executive branch, ―L‖ traditionally claimed control over international law interpretation. As international law
becomes an important aspect of the policy work of other agencies, however, ―L‖ no longer retains a firm hold on this function.
International law matters continue to be shifted away from the
Legal Adviser‘s office as other departments and agencies develop expertise. Former legal adviser Abe Sofaer has observed,
―[a]s foreign policies become more specialized . . . [other agencies] have the lead in many international issues.‖153 Many
agencies now have special departments devoted to international
affairs. Some typical examples include the Environmental Pro-

151. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 15.
152. See Bilder, supra note 138, at 638 (explaining that the organization of
―L‖ is designed to allow ―close and informal working relationships between the
Office and the various policy bureaus‖).
153. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 158 (quoting interview with
Abe Sofaer).
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tection Agency‘s Office of International and Tribal Affairs or the
Department of Labor‘s Bureau of International Labor Affairs.154
The legal adviser‘s office thus faces threats to its autonomy
from different quarters. Although the legal adviser generally
maintains that his office serves as the authoritative interpreter
and coordinator for international law, the legal adviser faces a
number of obstacles to fulfilling this objective. As Koh has observed,
Collective government decision-making creates enormous coordination problems. We in the Legal Adviser‘s Office are not the only lawyers in government: On any given issue, . . . our Department as a
whole then needs to coordinate its positions [with] our lawyer clients
(POTUS/SecState/DepSecState); White House Lawyers (WHCounsel/NSC Legal Counsel/USTR General Counsel); DOD Lawyers (OGC,
Jt Staff, CoComs, Services, JAGs); DOJ Lawyers (OLC, OSG, Litigating Divisions-Civ., Crim, OIL, NSD); IC Lawyers (DNI, CIA); DHS
Lawyers, not to mention lawyers in the Senate and House.155

In this process, the legal adviser is but one lawyer and lacks
the authority to consistently coordinate the legal efforts of lawyers throughout the executive branch, a function that has over
time shifted to White House lawyers in the Counsel‘s Office and
the National Security Council.156
The influence of the legal adviser on centralized decision
making will depend in large part on the dynamic between the
White House and the State Department.157 The relationship between the legal adviser and the White House turns on a number of factors. Important among these is the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State and, in turn,
154. The Mission Statement of the Bureau of International Labor Affairs
(ILAB) explains that the Bureau
leads the U.S. Department of Labor‘s efforts to ensure that workers
around the world are treated fairly and are able to share in the benefits of the global economy. ILAB‘s mission is to use all available international channels to improve working conditions, raise living standards, protect workers‘ ability to exercise their rights, and address the
workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable populations.
Bureau of Int‘l Labor Affairs, ILAB Mission Statement, U.S. DEP‘T OF LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/mission.htm ( last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
155. Koh, supra note 145.
156. AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA,
JCS, AND NSC 90–91 (1999) (explaining that presidents since Kennedy have
transitioned from a commitment to cabinet government toward the concept of
foreign policy run by the White House and the NSC).
157. The former legal advisers interviewed for Michael Scharf ‘s study disagreed about whether one‘s client was the President or the Secretary of State,
but most agreed that they primarily worked for the Secretary and through him
or her for the President. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 173–75.
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the relationship between the Secretary and his or her legal adviser. The Secretary must assure that the legal adviser has the
opportunity to weigh in on policy matters and not be shut out of
the process of providing legal advice within the Department.158
Moreover, the Secretary must sometimes fight for the legal adviser within the White House.
Since the Kennedy Administration, the White House has
sought to centralize control of foreign policy through the National Security Council (NSC), sometimes marginalizing or
shutting out the State Department, along with its legal adviser—a pattern that sometimes continues to be played out.159 The
increasing importance of the NSC has diminished the central
influence of the State Department, because the NSC legal adviser solicits advice from different agencies and offices and
manages an inter-agency process in which the State Department is but one player. Other White House offices have also asserted a centralizing force, such as the Office of the White
House Counsel.
Yet the legal adviser can sometimes play an important role
by providing the White House with the legal rationale it needs,
even when not directly related to international law. Recently,
for instance, Koh provided a rationale for what constituted
―hostilities‖ under the War Powers Resolution, concluding that
the military activities in Libya did not trigger the statute‘s requirement.160 The White House Counsel signed on to this interpretation, and the President followed this interpretation, apparently bypassing the advice of the Department of Justice.161
This action triggered the nearly uniform response that such interpretation was unsupported by the Administration‘s own description of its actions in Libya.162 Moreover, the Administration was criticized for failing to utilize the usual processes of
working through the Office of Legal Counsel, to the detriment
of its legal analysis.163
158. Id. at 57.
159. See ZEGART, supra note 156.
160. Savage, supra note 8.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. F. 62, 69–70 (2011) (arguing that although the President has the authority to overrule OLC, there are a number of institutional reasons why presidential overruling should be rare, including that the President benefits from
OLC‘s reputation for providing authoritative opinions).
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By contrast, during the administration of President George
W. Bush, the State Department often came into conflict with
the White House and the Department of Justice. Soon after
September 11, 2001, a group formed within the White House
and included the White House Counsel, the Vice President‘s
Counsel, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the
Deputy White House Counsel, and Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel.164 The group notably
excluded the State Department legal adviser and would ―plot
legal strategy in the war on terrorism, sometimes as a prelude
to dealing with lawyers from the State Department.‖165
The White House Counsel eventually determined that the
Attorney General had primary responsibility for advising the
President on matters of international law, even though on
many issues the legal adviser would also be consulted. Nonetheless, in the case of conflicting interpretations, the Counsel‘s
Office determined that the Attorney General would have the
final call.166 This created a constant source of tension between
the legal adviser and the Department of Justice. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice defended the legal adviser by repeatedly raising the dispute with the Attorney General.167 The Secretary advocated for her department and its lawyers to maintain
their traditional functions of advising with regard to the scope
and applicability of international law, but with little effect.
In the Bush Administration, the legal adviser was often on
the losing side of these battles.168 Yet, this does not mean the
office remained powerless. Because of the different centers of
power, the legal adviser could appeal to other constituencies—
Congress, the media, sympathetic foreign nations, NGOs, academics—outside of the White House in order to put pressure on
centralized decision makers. For example, when President
Bush decided, after substantial deliberation, that neither al
164. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 22.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. See id. at 22–24.
167. See id.
168. Other legal advisers have recounted turf battles with the Department
of Justice and other agencies. For instance, the Department of Justice sought
to control U.S. representation before the Iran-United States Claims tribunal in
The Hague. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 57. Davis Robinson, the
legal adviser at the time, noted this raised a serious and difficult ―turf battle‖
and eventually the President had to confirm the State Department‘s role in
representing the U.S. before the international tribunal. Id.; see also ZEGART,
supra note 156 (describing the accretion of power to NSC and away from the
State Department through specific examples in different administrations).
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Qaeda nor Taliban fighters would receive POW status under
the Geneva Conventions, someone leaked a memo from Secretary of State Colin Powell setting forth disagreements with this
approach.169 If necessary, the State Department can serve its
perceived ―mission‖ outside of centralized channels.
The legal adviser, because he oversees a legal office staffed
primarily with career bureaucrats who share in the larger mission and culture of the State Department, may not be the
quickest or most congenial source of legal advice for the White
House (except when it is). The focus of this office on the larger
imperatives of international law and diplomacy may sometimes, quite consciously, fail to provide the type of legal reasoning that supports presidential prerogatives and discretion. This
has sometimes furthered the resolve of the White House to seek
advice elsewhere. Yet, the State Department‘s advice may temper outcomes. For example, with regard to the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban, President Bush
adopted the State Department‘s rationale that the Conventions
applied to Afghanistan, but that the Taliban were ―unlawful
combatants‖ who had lost POW status.170 The adoption of this
rationale and justification may have been important for diplomatic stability and other international relationships—issues
that the State Department represents to the President as part
of its institutional role. Yet the State Department also displays
pragmatism and is not above taking forward-leaning interpretations to help the White House, as demonstrated by Koh‘s recent interpretation of the War Powers Resolution.
Even in the face of waning influence and competition from
other quarters, the legal adviser‘s office has in general held
tightly to its mission, which may preserve the culture of the office and the confidence of policy makers within State Department. The legal adviser may find a difficult balance between influencing White House policy decisions and maintaining its
independence and particular conscience- or diplomacy-based
approach.

169. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, supra note 3; see also YOO, supra
note 1, at 39; John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24,
2004, at 26.
170. See Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 5 (including the
subject line ―Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees‖).
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2. Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel
The General Counsel to the Department of Defense (DoD)
provides advice on all legal matters to the Secretary of Defense
and in recent years has taken an increasing role in the interpretation of international law. The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) focuses in large part on the law of war, which includes both customary international law norms pertaining to
the law of war, as well as treaties and other conventions. In
1974, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive establishing
the DoD Law of War Program.171 The program aimed to ensure
that ―the armed forces of the United States conduct all military
operations in compliance with the international law of war and
to prevent violations of the laws of war.‖172 All members of the
armed forces must go through law of war training, and legal advisors provide guidance during military operations about law of
war principles such as military necessity and proportionality.173
The organizational structure of DoD legal staff is complicated—the lawyers are divided into general counsel, staff judge
advocates, and legal advisors.174 DoD general counsels are
mostly civilians who work for the Secretaries of Defense, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.175 They provide the tasks ordinarily associated with general counsel of other agencies, such as assessing
the legal consequences of proposed policies and working with
policy makers to implement policies consistent with legal requirements.176 Staff judge advocates are ―traditional military
lawyers who practice administrative law, criminal law, legal
assistance, claims, and procurement.‖177 Finally, legal advisors
to the Unified Combatant Commanders focus on the legal aspects of war-fighting, including operational law and international agreement management.178 The legal advisor ―helps insure that the United States speaks with one voice in national
security matters‖ and is an advocate for the orderly develop171. Michael F. Lohr & Steve Gallotta, Legal Support in War: The Role of
Military Lawyers, 4 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 465, 470 n.23 (2003) (citing Dep‘t of Def.
Directive 5100.77 (revised Dec. 9, 1998)).
172. Id. at 470.
173. Id. at 470–71.
174. A helpful account of the structure of Department of Defense lawyers
can be found in William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He
Draws His Sword, 4 U. CHI. J. INT‘L L. 431, 433 (2003).
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 434.
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ment of international law.179 After restructuring in the 1990s,
the general counsel of the military departments were designated as the ―chief legal officers‖ of their respective departments
and oversee both civilian and military attorneys.180
DoD has thousands of civilian and military lawyers. Some
are civilian political appointments, but a significant proportion
of lawyers are career staff. The sheer size and diversity of functions and purposes makes it difficult to capture in this brief account the various incentives and dynamics among the legal staff.
There are, however, some recurring themes in the military
legal tradition. Within DoD exists a culture of honor that focuses on how particular interpretations of international law and
the law of war will affect the reputation of the armed services.
When evaluating various policy options, the emphasis on military honor may be presented as a reason for compliance with
international law. In this view, the military should hold itself
to the highest international standards, even if the United
States has not specifically accepted a particular treaty or formulation of customary international law.
For example, in the debate about whether the Geneva
Conventions applied to al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, the Bush
Administration determined that such protections would not apply.181 There was, however, significant dispute internally about
the legal reasons for this conclusion.182 The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers took the position that the
Geneva Conventions were ―‗ingrained in U.S. military culture,‘
that ‗an American soldier‘s self-image is bound up with the
Conventions,‘ and that ‗[a]s we want our troops, if captured,
treated according to the Conventions, we have to encourage respect for the law by our own example.‘‖183
The military lawyers argued for treating the Geneva Conventions as customary international law, making it irrelevant
whether al Qaeda had signed the Conventions.184 They insisted
that ―the principles applied to any war and to anyone that the

179. Id. at 435.
180. Kurt A. Johnson, Military Department General Counsel as “Chief Legal Officers”: Impact on Delivery of Impartial Legal Advice at Headquarters
and in the Field, 139 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
181. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 113.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 113–14.
184. YOO, supra note 1, at 35.
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United States fought.‖185 This sentiment requires holding the
military to a certain standard, regardless of whether an argument could be made that the treaty did not apply in a particular circumstance. This approach is often justified as a pragmatic attempt to ensure protection for U.S. troops overseas—
grounds for reciprocal treatment under the laws of war.186
There is a public relations aspect to this as well. Some former military lawyers have argued that the United States must
always try to keep up world public opinion by justifying and
explaining military actions and the use of force.187 Working
within a culture of legal accountability and public opinion both
at home and abroad, military lawyers often seek to ensure that
military actions can be justified under international law, particularly the laws of war. This preserves the reputation of the
U.S. military both at home and abroad, especially with other
democracies.188 Some observers have suggested that DoD lawyers have substantially internalized these norms.189
Yet, depending on the circumstances, DoD may define international law norms to preserve military flexibility. A recent
example, in the debate over the extent to which the United
States can kill Islamist militants in areas such as Yemen and
Somalia that are outside the battlefield in Afghanistan and
areas of Pakistan, DoD general counsel, Jeh Johnson, has taken the view that the United States can target groups aligned
with al Qaeda in countries that are unable or unwilling to suppress them.190 By contrast, State Department legal adviser Koh
has argued that the United States can take action outside the

185. Id.
186. See id. at 34 (―[Military lawyers] worried that if the United States did
not follow the Geneva Conventions, our enemies might take it as justification
to abuse American POWs in the future.‖).
187. See, e.g., Eckhardt, supra note 174, at 441.
188. James E. Baker, LBJ’s Ghost: A Contextual Approach to Targeting Decisions and the Commander in Chief, 4 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 407, 411 (2003).
189. For example, James E. Baker, who served as legal adviser to the National Security Council under President Clinton, explains that the Law of
Armed Conflict is not only operational law, but also provides good policy guidance because it sustains U.S. public support for such actions ―not necessarily
out of a societal sense of legal obligation but out of societal belief in the values
of discrimination (distinguishing between civilians and combatants) and necessity, which are embodied in the [ laws of war].‖ Id. at 412.
190. See Savage, supra note 9.
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battlefield only in self-defense, a standard that would comport
with the views of European allies.191
Another cultural dynamic within the Pentagon relates to
risk-averse behavior by military commanders who fear public
scrutiny and legal consequences of their actions and thus may
depend upon military lawyers to sanction the legality of the use
of force. Military lawyers thus may be used as a shield from the
legal consequences that may follow from the use of force.192 Similarly, lawyers may help the military operators act close to the
legal line.193 On the battlefield, JAG officers provide advice
about the scope of proposed actions and seek to ensure compliance with international law.194
Although DoD values its reputation and culture of compliance with the laws of war, determining the contours of the
law of war poses difficulties. There will often be debate about
what precisely such law requires, because although some law of
war is codified in treaties, most of it remains customary international law. In addition, many of the standards of the law of
war turn on contextual factors such as necessity and proportionality.195 Choosing between various actions may turn on factual assessments and policy considerations rather than on legal
analysis because there will often be a spectrum of lawful options available.196 ―The laws of war are often written in vague
terms, and are subject to different interpretations. They prohibit, for example, ‗disproportionate‘ casualties and ‗outrages
upon personal dignity‘—terms that can mean very different
things to different people, and that can easily be used as rhe191. See id.
192. See Lohr & Gallotta, supra note 171, at 467 (quoting Brigadier General Charles Dunlap as saying ―savvy American commanders seldom go to war
without their attorneys‖ because lawyers provide them ―with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues
of legality, so that whatever moral or operational doubts a commander may
have, he can at least be sure he will not face legal consequences‖).
193. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 91 (noting ―the swarm of lawyers
that rose up in the military and intelligence establishment to interpret multiplying laws and provide cover for those asked to act close to the legal line‖).
194. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT‘L L. 1, 15–27
(2010) (discussing how military lawyers influence conduct on the battlefield).
Dickinson concludes that military lawyers on the battlefield make a difference
with regard to international law compliance and suggests that internal organizational structure and institutional culture may be the key to ensuring
greater compliance with international law. Id. at 27–28.
195. See Baker, supra note 188, at 422–23.
196. See id. at 415.
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torical weapons.‖197 The malleability of these standards allows
for multiple interpretations, and these interpretations may depend in part on the incentives and interests of the particular
military lawyers.
Divisions over legal interpretation may arise between civilian and military lawyers, as well as between political and career attorneys. For example, John Yoo has identified a growing
tension between civilian-military relations with respect to military policy and legal interpretation.198 Yoo applies a principalagent framework to the civilian-military relationship and notes
that, particularly in the war on terrorism, the eventual goal
remains unclear and the civilians and military may well have
different preferences about how to proceed.199 In bringing their
opinions to the White House, civilian attorneys will likely have
the upper hand, in part because structurally the DoD general
counsel now oversees both civilian and military lawyers.
Yet, because of the size and scope of DoD, and the strong
sense of culture and mission held by many of the career lawyers, it is sometimes possible for them to influence military policy through other channels, such as by appealing to the courts,
Congress, and the media. For example, one way military lawyers can control policy is by dividing the ―principal‖ into its
component parts: ―In the war on terrorism, for example, JAG
opponents of President Bush‘s policies went to Congress and
testified against the administration‘s positions on the military
commission bill. JAG lawyers representing detainees at Guantanamo Bay also brought suit in federal court to enjoin military
commission proceedings from taking place.‖200 Judicial review
of these issues would be disruptive to the President‘s attempts
to coordinate policy. As Yoo indicates, ―The JAGs‘ appeal to international law is understandable as an effort to create more
autonomy by introducing foreign governments, international
entities and NGOs into the principals‘ decisionmaking
process.‖201 Lawyers within the DoD tried to use international

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 60.
Yoo, supra note 4, at 2283–87.
Id. at 2299.
Id. at 2300.
Id.
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law to drive policy in a direction at odds with its civilian leadership and with the decisions made by the White House.202
As with the State Department legal adviser, failure to influence centralized White House decision making does not necessarily cause agency lawyers to fall in line and adopt the
White House perspective. Quite the contrary, career lawyers
may seek to further their autonomy by deliberately pursuing a
course at odds with the administration. Career lawyers may
have greater allegiance to a principle of military honor or to
general principles of customary international law. When their
analysis conflicts with the Commander-in-Chief‘s interpretation of international law, the White House will often face difficulty in reigning in this sort of disagreement—continuing recalcitrance can exact a cost on an administration forced to
battle with critics from within its own agencies.
3. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is a small, elite office
within the Department of Justice that interprets the Constitution and federal laws for the executive branch. It is often called
upon to advise the President about the scope of his constitutional authority, including at times the requirements of international law. By statute, the Attorney General gives opinions
on matters of law to the President,203 and this opinion-writing
function has been largely delegated to OLC.204 OLC‘s best practices memorandum explains that its ―central function‖ is to further the President‘s constitutional duties to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.205 To accomplish this,
OLC must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the
law requires—not simply an advocate‘s defense of the contemplated
action or position proposed by an agency or the Administration. Thus,
in rendering legal advice, OLC seeks to provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain
202. See id. at 2290–91 (discussing efforts by JAG lawyers to challenge the
Bush Administration‘s policy on military commissions by filing suit in federal
court).
203. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 28 U.S.C. §§ 511, 512 (2006).
204. Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 337 (1993) (detailing the
modern role of OLC).
205. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen.,
to Attorneys of the Office (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Memorandum from David J. Barron], http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/ olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (explaining ―Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions‖).
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the Administration‘s or an agency‘s pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives.206

The structure of OLC allows for a significant degree of political control over the office. The office usually has about twenty attorneys—on average a third are talented career lawyers
who have served at OLC for many years and across administrations. The others are either political appointees or young lawyers chosen by political appointees because they share the general legal philosophy of the current administration. The
President appoints the head of the office, the Assistant Attorney General for OLC. Indeed, the White House often takes special interest in the appointment of the head of OLC, more so
than for other assistant attorneys general, precisely because of
the close relationship between OLC and the White House.207
Although the Assistant Attorney General for OLC reports directly to the Attorney General, he also has other clients, perhaps most importantly the White House and the White House
Counsel‘s Office.208
OLC has a culture of providing impartial legal advice of the
highest quality. In the traditional view, OLC should render quasi-judicial advice, aiming to provide legal advice free from political and policy calculations. As former Assistant Attorney
General for OLC Jack Goldsmith explains, ―[T]he office has developed powerful cultural norms about the importance of providing the President with detached, apolitical legal advice, as if
OLC were an independent court inside the executive
branch.‖209 Both the long-serving attorneys and those passing
through on their way to other appointments strive to maintain
the office‘s reputation for impartiality and high quality legal
analysis.210
Yet many of those who have worked in OLC have found
that this traditional view does not fully capture how OLC fulfills its role, nor how it should fulfill its role and its obligation
206. Id.
207. John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney
General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 375, 421 (1993) (discussing the relationship between the White House
and OLC); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 25–31 (describing his appointment to head OLC, which began with an interview with key White House
staff, including the White House Counsel, and then discussing how they would
approach the Attorney General for his approval).
208. See McGinnis, supra note 207.
209. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 33.
210. See McGinnis, supra note 207, at 422–24 (explaining how OLC‘s reputation serves the professional interests of its attorneys).
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to the President. Goldsmith notes that OLC should be politically attuned to the policies of the administration, which means
―OLC is not entirely neutral to the President‘s agenda‖ and the
President should get the benefit of the doubt with respect to legal advice.211 Similarly, John McGinnis explains that the central dilemma for the head of OLC is to provide ―his key patrons,
the White House Counsel and the Attorney General, with advice and opinions they find generally congenial while at the
same time upholding the reputation of the office as an elite institution whose legal advice is independent of the policy and political pressures associated with a particular question.‖212
Across administrations, OLC seeks to maintain a reputation as
a source of independent legal advice while also preserving an
institutional perspective favorable to the exercise of presidential power and protecting the President‘s authority, particularly
during times of war or crisis. Invariably, OLC finds that it must
balance the various pressures of the office to provide careful legal advice, while also serving the interests of the President.213
OLC has a distinct and unusual role because it serves not
only the agency of which it is a part, the Department of Justice,
but also operates as a specialized referral office for other agencies in the executive branch. Most legal offices serve only their
particular agencies, but OLC provides advice to agencies and
entities throughout the executive branch.214 When requested,
OLC will provide advice to other executive branch agencies on
difficult questions of law or with respect to an intra-agency dispute referred to OLC for an ―outside‖ legal opinion. Agencies
seek formal OLC opinions for a variety of reasons, including to
answer difficult questions or to deflect the political consequences of a particular legal decision.215 OLC also may serve as
a referee between two agencies with differing legal interpreta211. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 35.
212. McGinnis, supra note 207, at 422.
213. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 38–39 (―There is no magic formula
for how to combine legitimate political factors with the demands of the rule of
law. . . . OLC‘s success over the years has depended on its ability to balance
these competing considerations—to preserve its fidelity to law while at the
same time finding a way, if possible, to approve presidential actions.‖).
214. McGinnis, supra note 207, at 425. In addition, OLC often provides
Congress with the executive branch‘s legal review of proposed legislation, including identifying constitutional problems as well as problems in administration. Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 437, 466 (1993).
215. See Lund, supra note 214, at 492–95 (analyzing the incentives facing
agencies considering whether to seek an opinion from OLC).
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tions.216 OLC opinions are generally treated as controlling
within the executive branch on questions of law and therefore
bind the actions of executive officials.217
In domestic matters, if OLC‘s opinion is sought, its ability
to issue binding interpretations for the executive branch is relatively unchallenged, but it faces greater competition from other agencies with regard to international law. For instance, OLC
participates in the interagency process run by the National Security Council legal advisor, in which agencies can work
through their differences about the interpretation and application of international law. A number of legal disputes are resolved informally in this process. If agreement cannot be
reached, OLC might be called upon to resolve a dispute between agencies about the proper application of international
law. Yet the State Department legal adviser and counsel from
other agencies will often resist this role for OLC and press their
own institutional competence, expertise, and authority in matters of foreign and military legal policy.
Nevertheless, OLC plays an ongoing role in international
law interpretation. In ordinary times, OLC may be asked to determine whether a treaty is self-executing, how treaties should
be interpreted in light of ratifying statutes, and the extent to
which international agreements constrain proposed U.S. action.
During the war on terrorism, OLC has been asked to analyze
difficult and sensitive questions about the scope of interrogation methods, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters, the use of warrantless surveillance
techniques, and the legality drone attacks in a variety of circumstances.
As numerous accounts of the Bush Administration have
detailed, OLC became a significant source of legal advice for
the White House during the months and years following the attacks of September 11, 2001.218 In this role, OLC often came into conflict with the State Department. As John Yoo explains,
216. An executive order directs that agencies with a dispute should seek
the opinion of the Attorney General, who has delegated this opinion-writing
function to OLC. See Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979), reprinted as
amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2006). Before formulating a final opinion, OLC
will usually ask each interested agency to submit a memorandum setting forth
its legal analysis. The memoranda are generally shared with the other agencies in a back-and-forth process before a final opinion is rendered. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, supra note 205.
217. Lund, supra note 214, at 491.
218. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 1.
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OLC and the State Department often disagreed about the applicability of non-treaty international law and also about specific legal decisions such as whether the Geneva Conventions
would apply to Taliban prisoners of war.219 During this time,
OLC exercised significant control over legal determinations relating to the war on terrorism, and other sources of legal advice, such as the State Department Legal Adviser, were often
kept out of the loop.220
Yet OLC does not enjoy a permanent monopoly on advice.
The office operated without a confirmed head for nearly seven
years, including the first two and half years of the Obama Administration.221 Recently, President Obama determined that
military activities in Libya did not constitute ―hostilities‖ for
the purposes of the War Powers Resolution, adopting Koh‘s rationale reportedly over the disagreement of OLC and the Department of Justice.222
The Libya example demonstrates how the incentives for offering particular types of legal advice may be more complicated
for OLC than for other agencies, precisely because its ―business‖ and its reputation depend upon other branches coming to
them with legal problems. As Nelson Lund has observed, OLC
faces competition for providing legal advice from countless other lawyers within the executive branch.223 The function of OLC
is ―wholly advisory, and there is almost nothing that both must
be done and must be done by OLC.‖224 If the Attorney General,
other agencies, or the President lose confidence in OLC, they
can easily turn to other sources of legal advice. Moreover, if the
White House receives informal OLC advice that it disagrees
with or if the White House believes that OLC‘s analysis will not

219. YOO, supra note 1, at 33–34.
220. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 167 (explaining that some OLC opinions were never shown to the State Department and ―[White House Counsel
Alberto] Gonzales made it a practice to limit readership of controversial legal
opinions to a very small group of lawyers‖).
221. Jack Goldsmith resigned in July 2004 and Virginia Seitz was confirmed to the position in June 2011. See Jerry Markon, Waiting Ends at the
Justice Dept., WASH. POST, July 4, 2011, at A13.
222. See Savage, supra note 8.
223. Lund, supra note 214, at 488 (noting that the Justice Department has
never secured a monopoly on providing legal advice within the government
and that each agency has its own legal advisors that have ―no formal obligation to submit even the most difficult legal questions to the Department of
Justice‖).
224. Id. at 496.
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support a proposed course of action, the White House may
simply decline to seek a formal OLC opinion.
This competition to control the provision of legal advice affects the behavior of OLC, particularly the Assistant Attorney
General who heads the office. As Lund explains, the importance
and influence of OLC will depend on what the head chooses to
make of it and the functions of OLC will be ―determined primarily by its relationship with the White House.‖225 The relationship between OLC and the White House Counsel‘s Office is
often a close one in which legal opinions are often provided informally and cooperatively. Lund argues that the incentives for
the head of OLC suggest that the office will be more responsive
to the interests of the White House than to other agencies and
will assist the White House in maintaining control over the legal policy of other agencies.226 These observations comport with
the historical role of OLC, the individuals appointed to lead the
office, and their subsequent appointments to the judiciary and
other high-ranking government positions.
The incentives facing OLC provide some understanding of
why that office has traditionally viewed international law questions from the President‘s perspective and has generally been
deferential to his decision-making authority with regard to international law. For example, OLC has typically defined customary international law narrowly, relying primarily on historical state practices as opposed to forward-leaning
interpretations of new forms of customary international law.227
The debate over the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to
al Qaeda and Taliban fighters highlights these institutional differences. OLC argued that the Geneva Conventions ―had not
assumed the status of customary international law that bound
the United States . . . . There was no customary international
law on terrorist organizations like al Qaeda that could launch a
devastating international attack.‖228 By contrast, the State Department argued that the Conventions must apply to Afghanis225. Id. at 495.
226. Id. at 499.
227. See, e.g., Auth. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Override Int‘l
Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 170 (1989) (concluding that the FBI may use its statutory authority to investigate and arrest
individuals who violate U.S. law even if their actions contravene customary
international law and moreover that the President has inherent authority to
order such investigations and arrests ―in a manner that departs from international law‖).
228. YOO, supra note 1, at 36.
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tan, even if not to the Taliban fighters specifically, because of
the consequences of declaring Afghanistan to be a ―failed
state.‖229 Secretary Powell‘s memo to President Bush explained
that application of the Conventions to Afghanistan was necessary because it ―preserves U.S. credibility and moral authority
by taking the high ground, and puts us in a better position to
demand and receive international support.‖230
OLC‘s incentives encourage providing the President with
legal interpretations that keep open political options, particularly with regard to foreign affairs. OLC is more likely than
some of the other legal departments to interpret law in light of
the President‘s constitutional authority. This allows OLC to be
more ―useful‖ than other agencies to the White House when it
contemplates actions close to the line of what international law
forbids. OLC sometimes says ―no,‖ but when it does, it risks,
perhaps more than other agencies, the President turning to
other sources of advice.
4. National Security Council Legal Advisor
The National Security Council (NSC) was created by the
National Security Act of 1947 and was intended to ―advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign,
and military policies relating to the national security.‖231 Operating from the White House, the NSC coordinates agencies dealing
with defense and foreign policy and helps the President implement his foreign policies by getting these agencies to work together.232 To be effective, however, the NSC must do more than
just coordinate. It must ―define a presidential strategy for the
conduct of foreign and military affairs. The President has both
unique responsibilities and a unique perspective; his breadth of
view is not likely to be shared by any single agency.‖233
NSC assists the President by considering national security
issues from his viewpoint—filtering the demands of national
security through the full range of the President‘s foreign policy
and military objectives, as well as his unique and singular re229. Id. at 34.
230. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, supra note 3.
231. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006).
232. WILSON, supra note 109, at 273 (―The difficulty of getting the departments of defense and state as well as the CIA and the military to work together harmoniously toward presidential objectives is like untying the Gordian
knot: even with a strong NSC staff, it is difficult and sometimes impossible.‖).
233. Id.
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sponsibilities. Since the 1960s, national security advisors ―have
clearly seen themselves as the president‘s men; they have engaged in policy debates, offered policy advice, and managed the
NSC process in ways that serve the particular political interests of the president and no one else.‖234 Over time, the NSC
has become a key center of foreign policymaking. The staff has
significantly increased in size and is comprised of presidential
appointees who are ―expected to view foreign policy from his
perspective.‖235
President Reagan created the position of legal advisor to
the NSC in 1987.236 As with other members of the NSC staff,
the legal advisor is appointed by the President and takes on the
obligation to represent the presidential perspective in working
through disputes with other agencies.237 The President often
appoints the legal advisor from elsewhere in the White House,
as President Reagan did with the first advisor.238 During the
George W. Bush Administration, several of the NSC legal advisors were picked from the White House Counsel‘s Office. This
ensures that the advisors were familiar to the President and
key White House staff and could be trusted to represent the
President‘s perspective with respect to international law
matters.239
The NSC legal advisor coordinates foreign legal policy between the State and Defense Departments, the military, and
the intelligence agencies. He controls the interagency process
with regard to questions of international law and referees turf
wars between the various agencies, including in particular the
State Department legal adviser and the Office of Legal Counsel. Consistent with the culture of NSC, the legal advisor serves
the President‘s interests and mediates conflicts in light of the
core constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. Although this position has received little
scholarly or media attention, the NSC legal advisor can exert
significant influence on the interpretation of international law,
234. ZEGART, supra note 156, at 85.
235. Id. at 86, 103 (discussing Congress‘s limited oversight capabilities for
the NSC compared to the Departments of State and Defense).
236. See BRADLEY HAWKES PATTERSON, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE
THE WEST WING AND BEYOND 66–67 (2001).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. This fits precisely with the mission of NSC articulated by a number of
National Security Advisers and staffers interviewed by Amy Zegart in her
study. ZEGART, supra note 156, at 85, 98.
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determining its scope and how it will apply to proposed presidential actions. The legal advisor must enjoy the trust and confidence of the President, who can closely monitor the work of
NSC. ―Armed with rewards, sanctions, and a direct monitoring
ability, the president could trust the NSC staff to weigh and assess the conflicting policy recommendations coming from the
foreign policy bureaucracies.‖240 Over time, this dynamic has
significantly increased the authority of the NSC and its legal
advisor in relation to the other agencies.
***
This Part has analyzed several of the key legal offices involved with making determinations about international law
compliance. Although it does not examine all of the offices in
the executive branch that handle matters of international law,
it identifies the entities primarily responsible for international
law interpretation. The agencies discussed here represent the
wide diversity of interests and incentives within the executive
branch, as well as various structural differences in how these
offices operate both internally and in their relation to other
agencies. It demonstrates how these agencies balance the dictates of law and policy in different ways based on their particular perspectives. The next Part focuses on how the President
seeks to coordinate these diverse approaches and use them to
his advantage.
III. COORDINATION FAILURES AND COMPETITION
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The public choice analysis demonstrates that there are
many different individuals and agencies that impact centralized decisions about international law compliance. Lawyers
throughout the executive branch analyze the scope and applicability of international law. These lawyers have different interests and incentives and often approach questions of international law from their particular perspectives, which are shaped
by, inter alia, the specific interests of the agencies they serve,
the norms and culture of their offices, the interaction between
political and career lawyers, and the relationship of their agencies to the White House.
This Part examines institutional mechanisms within the
bureaucracy for dealing with difficulties of coordination that
240. Id. at 97–98.
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arise from having conflicting interpretations of international
law. First, it describes the available institutions for coordination of international law interpretation and observes that such
coordination is uncertain and imperfect. Second, it predicts how
agencies will behave within these constraints. The lack of coordination creates instability and uncertainty that makes it rational for agencies to continue to press their different perspectives and compete for control over interpretation of
international law. Third, it raises, but does not answer, the
question of whether such a system benefits the President by
presenting a robust debate over difficult questions of international law and policy.
A. IMPERFECT COORDINATION
The difficulties of coordinating our vast bureaucracy have
been well-developed in the domestic context.241 Moreover, scholars have addressed the difficulties of asserting presidential
control over the administrative state, again, largely with reference to domestic regulation.242 These insights, however, have
for the most part not played a significant role in understanding
compliance with international law. Instead, many of the unitary theories discussed above assume that despite the difficulties
of coordination and control, the ―state‖ formulates decisions
about international law in a coherent and unitary manner.
Even those who would disaggregate the state, like Slaughter
and Koh, focus on the possibilities and promise of decentralized
action, not on the problems that can and do result from decisions about international policy being made by numerous agency entities.243
Yet coordination and cooperation present significant difficulties for the purpose of international law compliance. There is
no consistent process for sifting through and coordinating these
agency perspectives, interests, and incentives when interpreting international law. Congress and the President have made
efforts to impose centralized control over these issues, but coordination efforts have generally not succeeded in unifying perspectives on international law in a systematic or consistent

241. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 109, at 264 –74.
242. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 47; Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Symposium, Presidential Influence Over Administrative Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (2011).
243. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 213; Koh, supra note 69, at 204 –05.
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way.244 As James Q. Wilson observed, given the ―incomplete
control the president has over many important subordinates, it
is hardly surprising that presidents have taken to reorganizations the way overweight people take to fad diets—and with
about the same results.‖245
For example, the Office of Legal Counsel, NSC legal advisor, and the State Department all have some authority to coordinate questions of international law. The Attorney General,
and as a practical matter, the Office of Legal Counsel, have
been delegated responsibility for resolving legal disputes between agencies, including on matters of international law. Yet
OLC can only resolve disputes that are referred to it. The
White House may decline to seek a formal OLC opinion when it
has reason to believe the opinion will be unfavorable to the
President‘s preferred alternative. Accordingly, OLC‘s authority
to coordinate executive branch legal policy waxes and wanes
depending on the extent to which it enjoys the trust of the
White House and other agencies.246
In the George W. Bush Administration, OLC played a central role in assessing legal issues arising from the War on Terror. Recently, however, President Obama effectively shut out
OLC‘s institutional role in determining whether military actions in Libya constituted ―hostilities‖ for the purposes of the
War Powers Resolution.247 Rather than rely on OLC to solicit
opinions from the relevant agencies, OLC was reportedly one of
several offices to submit its opinion to the President, who made
the final decision against the advice of the Department of Justice and along the lines suggested by the State Department legal adviser Harold Koh.248
Similarly, the legal advisor to the National Security Council oversees an interagency process that serves to mediate divergent agency perspectives. This creates a centralized process
in the White House that is run by hand-picked advisors
representing the President‘s unique perspective. Historically,
the State Department legal adviser has asserted a central and
244. See ZEGART, supra note 156, at 37–38.
245. WILSON, supra note 109, at 264.
246. See Lund, supra note 214, at 440, 496–98.
247. See Savage, supra note 8.
248. See id. (explaining that Caroline Krass, acting head of OLC, ―was
asked to submit the Office of Legal Counsel‘s thoughts in a less formal way to
the White House, along with the views of lawyers at other agencies. After several meetings and phone calls, the rival legal analyses were submitted to Mr.
Obama, who is a constitutional lawyer, and he made the decision‖).
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authoritative role with regard to the interpretation of, and
compliance with, international law. As discussed above, however, the legal adviser‘s authority has diminished over the years
as the White House has sought to centralize this function in the
NSC and as other agencies have developed expertise on matters of international law.249 The legal adviser, however, can still
gain the ear of the President, depending on the particular issue
and the level of personal trust between them.
This highlights not only the multiple sources of legal advice, but also the absence of any singular mechanism for resolving legal disputes between agencies. Although counsel and policy makers often resolve their differences through OLC,
negotiation within the NSC, or various informal processes,
there is no necessary manner in which advice on international
law must be sought or implemented when legal advisors disagree. Even the mechanisms that do exist, such as through NSC
or OLC, can be easily bypassed by White House officials and
other policy makers if they choose to do so.
Of course, the President can always overcome coordination
failures. The executive branch benefits from having a unitary
and powerful head who directs foreign policy and in theory can
ultimately decide questions of international law.250 The ability
of the President to bypass squabbling between agencies and
formulate his own position with regard to international law retains the possibility of strong unitary action.
Practically speaking, however, the President cannot formulate independent legal policy on every question of international
law. He must rely on the many advisors within the executive
branch who analyze these questions and he cannot fully control
the type of legal advice he receives. Lawyers within the executive branch may have ideological views of law and policy that
conflict with the President‘s perspective, or that serve a narrower agency interest, or that elevate the importance of inter249. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 71; Koh, supra note 145.
250. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (―Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition
of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks; it is not less essential . . . to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.‖); see also ZEGART, supra note 156, at 30 (―Though the framers may not have intended it,
foreign policy has become the president‘s turf. It is the executive who bears
chief responsibility for U.S. decisions in the international arena, and who has
developed the capacity to exercise that responsibility within the American political system.‖).
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national law over other interests. The President may be asked
to resolve the most high-profile disputes over the applicability
of international law or he may take a particular interest in
some issues. Other consequential decisions, however, may not
rise to the level of presidential or centralized decision making.
Furthermore, even on matters in which the President has
made a final resolution, he cannot always guarantee its full execution. Agencies may continue to pursue divergent policies despite White House decision. The rifts over legal policy are a
subset of a broader category of foreign policy disputes. For example, with the recent popular uprising in Egypt, President
Obama found his Secretary of State and envoy to Egypt carrying a different message than the one he wanted to send.251 The
Secretary of State adopted a more traditional foreign policy
view, focusing on stability in the region, whereas the President
eventually supported the protesters and the push for democracy.252 Likewise, on intervention in Libya, various administration officials expressed different perspectives on its advisability
and relation to the national interest. Charlie Savage, the New
York Times reporter who has uncovered a number of executive
branch disputes, has quipped that perhaps his reporting serves
an interagency coordination function.253
Agencies and legal advisors have a vested interest in their
preferred policies and legal interpretations and often have
agendas independent of the President. The President‘s decision
to go in one direction will not necessarily eliminate resistance
within his administration. Even if the political leadership at
the agencies falls into line with the President, as may be expected, there may be counsel who remain faithful to their agency culture or mission. Career attorneys in powerful agencies
such as the Departments of State and Defense may persist in
championing perspectives at odds with the President by appealing to Congress, the media, or nongovernmental organizations.254 Even speculation about dissenting perspectives can
undermine public confidence in the President‘s decision. In
these instances, the President may pursue one course while his
251. See, e.g., Helene Cooper et al., In U.S. Signals to Egypt, Obama
Straddled a Rift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at A1.
252. Id.
253. See Keith Gerver, Liveblogging Session 7: Keynote Address of New York
Times Reporter Charlie Savage, LAWFARE: HARD NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICES
(Sept. 17, 2011, 5:46 PM) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/liveblogging
-session-7-keynote-address-of-new-york-times-reporter-charlie-savage.
254. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 2287, 2299–300.
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subordinates continue to advance another or leak dissenting legal perspectives. Although the unitary structure of our executive branch is designed to minimize such occurrences, the sheer
size and scope of the federal bureaucracy make it difficult for
the President to fully coordinate the efforts of his subordinates.
Existing coordination mechanisms have not succeeded in
establishing a clear hierarchy of authority. The President may
at any time simply interpret the law, but short of this, there
remain a number of offices and agencies that lay claim to controlling international law interpretation. Depending on the particular individuals as well as other political dynamics between
the agencies and the White House, one or another office may
manage to gain the ear of the White House.
B. INSTABILITY ENCOURAGES COMPETITION
The lack of coordination results in unpredictability about
the pathways of international legal interpretation. Faced with
a shifting landscape in which there is always the possibility of
imposing a different legal viewpoint, agencies will have an incentive to press their perspectives. Rational agencies will respond to this institutional instability by competing for control
over international policy and legal interpretation. Because
agency heads do not know in any particular circumstance what
interpretation or policy will be chosen, it is rational for them to
expend political capital for the adoption of their preferred alternative.
Bureaucratic politics are especially important in foreign affairs because there are fewer domestic interest groups and legislative tools for addressing these issues are often ineffective or
difficult for Congress to mobilize.255 Executive branch agencies
therefore control more decision making in this area, at least at
the outset. Bureaucratic competition is especially prevalent
with respect to foreign affairs and national security because a
number of different agencies have overlapping jurisdiction—the
State Department, the Department of Defense, the Department
of Homeland Security, and intelligence agencies all have a
stake in foreign matters and the interpretation of international
law. The shared area is greater in foreign affairs and national
security than in domestic affairs: ―Their activities inherently
overlap and intersect. Diplomatic negotiations have serious
255. Daniel W. Drezner, Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of
Foreign Policy, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 733, 735 (2000).
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consequences for military action and vice versa. Intelligence is
intimately connected to grand strategy, military power, and
diplomacy. To do their jobs, national security officials must
concern themselves with other agencies.‖256
Moreover, competition in this area tends to be exaggerated
because of the perceived or actual indeterminacy of international law. New types of warfare and evolving technological capacity raise difficult questions in areas in which there is little
or no state practice and few relevant judicial decisions, allowing for a range of legitimate interpretations. In this context,
agencies may compete to define the range of what is legally
permissible, but also what course of action is moral, militarily
possible, diplomatically feasible, and politically desirable.
C. PRESIDENT‘S ADVANTAGE?
Given all of the attempts at coordination, one might assume that the President would prefer greater control over the
bureaucracy. Indeed, a system in which there is only imperfect
coordination and ongoing competition has significant costs. It
can result in instability and uncertainty and the possibility
that dissenting views will persist within the agencies, making
it difficult for the President to implement his chosen policies.
Domestically, bureaucratic competition may allow for flexibility, but also the possibility of confusion and the opportunity for
powerful agency interests to proceed in a manner contrary to
the President‘s directives. Overseas, displays of intragovernmental disputes may make it difficult for the President
to credibly commit to compliance on behalf of the United
States.
Although this process can be viewed as a ―failure‖ of coordination, a disaggregated system of agency competition could
offer some benefits to the President. The persistence—and indeed acceleration—of disaggregation in the executive branch
(in the form of new agencies)257 suggests that it provides some
advantages to the President. Many of the agencies are initiated
or created by the President and these are more closely subject

256. ZEGART, supra note 156, at 37.
257. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of 50
U.S.C.) (creating the Department of National Intelligence); Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 6 U.S.C.) (creating the Department of Homeland Security).
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to White House control.258 Agency competition over international law interpretation and policy provides the President with
analysis from a diverse range of perspectives that may take into account the diplomatic, strategic, military, and intelligence
consequences resulting from particular courses of action. Maintaining competition and flexibility in international law interpretation can serve the President‘s interests by providing more
information and keeping open a wider range of policy
alternatives.259
The agencies are well designed to represent their particular interests. Separation of interests and perspectives may allow ambition to counteract ambition within the different agencies in the executive branch.260 Unanimity being impossible and
perhaps undesirable, it may be better to allow competing positions to have it out in the inter-agency process.
On important issues, the President can have a full hearing
from agencies with different perspectives, providing him with
more information about the implications and consequences of a
foreign policy or military decision. Moreover, agencies
represent different constituencies and interests, helping the
President to remain democratically accountable. The executive
power rests ultimately with the President, but he may best be
able to exercise this power by allowing his advisors to represent
their particular perspectives.
If Presidents wanted to assert only their constitutional
prerogatives, they could rely on close legal and political advi258. William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design,
64 J. POL. 1095, 1096 (2002) (describing how many agencies are designed and
created by the President unilaterally and that ―presidents exercise significantly more control over those agencies that they create through a unilateral directive than those agencies that congress and the president establish through
legislation‖).
259. See WILSON, supra note 109, at 274 (noting that there may be some
benefits of agency duplication and overlap and that redundancy can be useful
because overlapping agencies ―can lead to more flexible responses and generate alternatives‖); ZEGART, supra note 156, at 8 (explaining that ―national security organizations are not rationally designed to serve the national interest—and for perfectly rational reasons‖).
260. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (―This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs,
private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange
the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the
public rights.‖).
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sors within the White House, but they generally do not, because they want to know all of the political, diplomatic, and
strategic possibilities consistent with the law. The White House
generally does not allow for the permanent supremacy of one
agency over the others. For example, even if OLC has presumptive authority to settle executive branch disputes, the office can
be bypassed if the White House declines to get a formal opinion
or the President determines to follow the legal analysis of
another agency. This uncertainty creates a strong incentive for
the agencies to represent their perspectives robustly in competition with others. By contrast, if the President always relied on
a singular source for advice about international law, other agencies would eventually expend resources in a different direction.
Ongoing agency competition ensures that a variety of different approaches may be assessed as compliant with international law. This flexibility provides the President a wider range
of alternatives when dealing with other nations. Where possible, the President can decide on policy, not legal grounds. Ongoing competition may present a process for formulating the best,
most considered state interests. In addition, such competition
may sometimes be useful to the President because it allows him
to find a legal rationale for his favored policy. Presidents often
interpret the law in light of their particular interests, which
may be simply part of the President‘s authority to execute the
laws.261
Yet there are costs to an institutional lack of coordination:
such a system makes it harder to impose a unitary will at the
end of a fractured process with strongly developed interests.
Lack of centralized control may make it difficult for the President to work with Congress or to credibly engage with foreign
countries. Whether this system ultimately serves national interests or even the President‘s interests is beyond the scope of
261. Commentators disagree about whether this is a natural and acceptable consequence of the President‘s authority or whether Presidents at times
use this authority inappropriately to frustrate the authority of Congress.
Compare Eric Posner, Stop Complaining About Harold Koh’s Interpretation of
the War Powers Act, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 1, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/
article/politics/91166/harold-koh-war-powers-john-yoo-libya (noting that the executive practice of interpreting statutes in line with presidential authority is
part of historical practice and the status quo), with Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s
Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN POL‘Y ( Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy
.com/articles/2011/03/24/obama_s_unconstitutional_war (arguing that by unilaterally going to war against Libya, President Obama is ―breaking new ground
in its construction of an imperial presidency—an executive who increasingly
acts independently of Congress at home and abroad‖).
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this Article. The dynamic of inconsistent coordination and ongoing competition, however, has consequences for the development of international law and the possibility of systemic compliance by states, as discussed in the next Part.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS
The public choice perspective presented in this Article
identifies the incentives and interests of government officials
responsible for the interpretation of international law. Moreover, it suggests that these interests will often diverge and as an
institutional matter the executive lacks consistent mechanisms
for coordinating interests. In this environment of uncertainty,
agencies will continue to compete for control of central decision
making about questions of international law.
This Part explains three different consequences that follow
from this analysis. First, it highlights the limitations of unitary
state actor theories for predicting compliance with international law. The executive branch provides the best possibility for
unitary-state action. Yet even in this branch the failure to
coordinate interpretation and the existence of ongoing competition between agencies undermine the assumption of the state
as a unitary actor. The public choice analysis may be complementary, however, to rational choice theories by providing an
account of how states formulate their interests and objectives
with regard to international law compliance.
Second, agency competition will encourage exploiting the
indeterminacy of international law. This is a consequence of the
type of domestic actors involved, their incentives and preferences, and how they work within the institutions of the executive branch. As discussed above, inconsistent coordination between different agency interests results in instability that
creates incentives for competition between agency officials for
control over the interpretation of international law.262 States as
well as sub-state actors may prefer to retain flexibility and ambiguity in international law, because this will allow officials to
present a wide range of policy alternatives as compliant with
international law. Instead of developing habits of compliance,
as other liberal or disaggregated theories predict, government
officials may internalize a habit of flexible or instrumental
compliance—they will figure out how to make their preferred
policies compliant with international law.
262. See supra Part III.B.
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Finally, the public choice account may provide another explanation for why international law does not exhibit the clarity
and enforcement often considered an aspiration for international law. Greater clarity in international law, both treaties
and customary international law, would limit the range of ―lawful‖ options available to agency officials competing for control of
international legal interpretation. The ongoing disagreement
about the meaning and application of international law in some
contexts may make it difficult to assert a fixed meaning of international law. Whether this dynamic observed in the United
States will impact the development of international law will
depend in part on whether other states exhibit similar bureaucratic competition and strategic uses of international law.
Liberal theories that focus on domestic preferences predict
that a shift to non-state actors will further the development
and compliance with international law by states. By contrast,
the public choice model looks at both domestic preferences and
institutional coordination mechanisms and predicts that substate actors will have strong incentives to keep international
law relatively indeterminate and flexible. Efforts to make international law more law-like or ―hard‖ will face resistance, not
only among states, but also among sub-state actors.
A. LIMITATIONS OF UNITARY STATE THEORIES
As explained in Part I, many of the predominant theories
of international law model the state as a unitary actor and seek
to explain international law compliance by reference to the behavior of this institutional ―individual.‖ Unitary-state models
have longstanding appeal in part because they simplify national complexity to explain why states comply with international
law. Pulling apart the incentives and interests of legal departments in the executive branch highlights some of the limitations of unitary state models. Public choice demonstrates that
even in the unitary executive branch, there is no consistent or
predictable method for coordinating divergent interests between agencies.
These conclusions do not have to lead to radical state skepticism, nor do they discount the idea that the state can behave
as if a unitary entity. Indeed, for many purposes, the state interacts with the international community as a singular entity.
States wage war, sign treaties, make trade agreements, and
engage in diplomacy. Unitariness captures an important aspect
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of the state‘s legal personality in international law.263 Yet unitary theories have difficulty explaining how states formulate
their interests and goals, which in turn diminishes their ability
to make predictions about international law compliance. The
public choice critique notes the incompleteness of unitary accounts and their thinness when pressed about how to understand state interests and state behavior with respect to international law.
Unitary-state theories do not deny that the state is an aggregation of various individuals and entities—they model the
state ―as if‖ it were a unitary actor for the purpose of making
predictions about state behavior.264 They suggest that the simplified unitary-state model has more explanatory power.265
263. Most theorists presenting disaggregated analysis recognize the ongoing importance of the unitary state. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 19
(―States can be disaggregated for many purposes and in many contexts and
still be completely unitary actors when necessary, such as in decisions to go to
war. And even their component parts still represent national interests in various ways.‖).
264. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 7 (―[ W ]e do not claim
that the axioms of rational choice accurately represent the decision-making
process of a ‗state‘ in all its complexity . . . . Rather, we use rational choice
theory pragmatically as a tool to organize our ideas and intuitions and to clarify assumptions.‖); WALTZ, supra note 25, at 93–94 (explaining that realists
take states as the unit of international relations not because they are the only
actors, but because they are the major ones); Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a
Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1918
(2003); Alexander Thompson, Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S285, S291 (2002)
(―Those who treat states as unitary assume either that the state aggregates all
domestic preferences—of individuals, interest groups, and various intergovernmental actors—and acts as if it were a single actor or that state decision
making is in fact channeled through a single or small group of crucial individuals who make important decisions.‖).
265. See Posner, supra note 74, at 833 (―[ I]t seems plausible that the best
understanding of international law must come from disaggregating the state.
However, it is a common error to think that a more complex and realistic methodology is always better. Too much methodological complexity renders prediction-making impossible. . . . The way that states make decisions may be interesting or important, but it is of little help for predicting such things as
whether states go to war or comply with international law.‖); see also WENDT,
supra note 47, at 221 (―In sum, concrete individuals play an essential role in
state action, instantiating and carrying it forward in time, but state action is
no more reducible to those individuals than their action is reducible to neurons in the brain.‖); Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law:
Comment on Conference Papers, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S321, S321 (2002) (―Among
the radically simplifying assumptions that I employ is that nations in their
relations with each other, whether commercial or noncommercial, or even belligerent, behave much like individuals in their commercial relations. This is
not as wild an assumption as it may seem . . . .‖).

2011] PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

263

Theorists who posit with a unitary state have generally assumed the existence of mechanisms for coordinating state interests, but have provided scant account of how such mechanisms might operate given the expansive and diverse
bureaucratic state and the competing centers for international
law interpretation.
The public choice analysis suggests that given the existing
structure of decision making amongst sub-state actors, the possibility of the state behaving even ―as if ‖ a unitary actor is
highly tenuous. Even focusing only on the executive branch,
which presents the best possibility for unitary behavior, the unitary model has serious limitations, and the disaggregation becomes even more acute when considering the role of Congress,
the courts, and private organizations. An evaluation of the behavior of legal departments within the executive branch reveals
a diversity and complexity of inputs, as well as evidence of ongoing competition between conflicting viewpoints, that does not
easily allow for a simple unified state model for international
law compliance.
Unitary theories of international law compliance run
against basic understandings of domestic political behavior—
both constitutional and administrative—yet do not provide an
explanation of how political behavior and bureaucratic
processes may differ with regard to decisions about international law. One cannot preclude the possibility that there may
be mechanisms by which a well-ordered state can behave as a
unitary entity and pursue rational or moral goals, but the public choice analysis of these processes in the United States raises
serious doubts about this possibility.266 At a minimum, proponents of unitary theories have not explained how one can model
a unitary state interest in these circumstances.
The public choice model of international law compliance
points out the limitations of unitary theories; however, it is
more compatible with some theories than others, an unsurprising result given the diversity of unitary theories, which span a
wide range of approaches to state behavior in international
law.
For example, public choice turns up little support for institutional cosmopolitanism, which assumes that the state has
266. This Article has focused on the United States, but it might be that
other liberal democracies have developed more centralized processes for dealing with divergent perspectives and interests with regard to international law.
Again, comparative research would help draw more general conclusions.
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moral obligations to comply with certain norms of international
law.267 Such global responsibilities for human well-being assume that states can act with concern for these higher goals.
Yet in the sub-state process of decision making, who has the incentive or interest to raise moral concerns of global responsibility? The State Department at times expresses a moral or conscience-based approach to international law, but it balances
this with pragmatic, diplomatic imperatives. Undoubtedly
there may be officials in the executive branch who believe the
state should pursue certain forms of global welfare or who are
committed to a generally cosmopolitan and expansive view of
international law. These individuals and perhaps also some
nongovernmental organizations may sometimes shape international policy, but nothing in the actual operation of how the
state negotiates competing interests of international law suggests that sub-state actors systematically or even regularly
pursue such interests.
Scholars and advocates can argue that a state and its officials should pursue cosmopolitan interests, but such normative
arguments must be distinguished from predictions that states
can and will pursue global objectives because of their institutional capacities. This institutional capacity must depend, in
part, on the individuals running the institutions. Modeling the
state as a unitary entity that will shoulder cosmopolitan responsibilities ignores the gritty reality of the process of international law decision making—in which global responsibility, if
present at all, will be one of a number of interests and agendas
competing for the attention of centralized decision makers in
the White House. The incentives of policy makers and lawyers
tend to favor more pragmatic, instrumental uses of international law that maintain flexibility for agencies as well as the
White House.
By contrast, the public choice analysis of international law
compliance may be complementary to rational choice theories,
such as Goldsmith and Posner‘s theory that state compliance
with international law can usually be explained by rational or
pragmatic reasons, rather than simply by a propensity to comply with international law.268 The public choice analysis ex267. See supra Part I.B.
268. See GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (―Once the domestic political process
plays itself out, however, the state may pursue those policy goals on the international stage in a rational and unitary way. From this perspective, the liberal
model serves as an input for the institutionalist model.‖); ERIC A. POSNER,
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amines sub-state behavior, considering the incentives, interests, and agendas of executive branch agencies and their lawyers. These interests reflect the rational calculation of actors
within the bureaucracy based on the many factors discussed
above. It suggests that agency officials responsible for interpreting and applying international law will respond, like all
agency officials, to the incentives they face. In this case, pervasive competition for control of international policymaking creates
strong incentives to treat international law instrumentally.
Domestic bureaucratic processes help the President determine what constitutes a state interest, which the state then
pursues in international relations. Furthermore, if such disaggregation is purposeful or serves important benefits, a unitary
interest may develop after consideration of competing legal interpretations. By explaining the interests and incentives of
lawyers who help shape the development of state interests, disaggregated public choice insights may be compatible with the
conclusions that Goldsmith and Posner reach about rational
state behavior.
Public choice may serve as a complement to rational choice
theory precisely because one of the difficulties with the rational
choice model is that it does not provide much information about
how a ―state‖ identifies or formulates its interests.269 Goldsmith
and Posner address the complexity of state interests by pegging
these to the ―preferences of the state‘s political leadership.‖270
They acknowledge, ―[t]his assumption is a simplification and is
far from perfect. But it is parsimonious, and it‘s appropriate because a state‘s political leadership, influenced by numerous inputs, determines state actions related to international law.‖271
Moreover, they observe, ―institutions that translate individual
preferences into particular policies are always imperfect, potentially derailed by corruption, incompetence, or purposeful hurdles (like separation of powers), and sometimes captured by interest groups.‖272 Although they recognize that there might be
problems with the collective rationality of states, Goldsmith
THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 78 (2009) (noting some value to disaggregating states because the ―biggest problem with the unitary state model is that
defining a state ‗interest‘ in the abstract, without any reference to the desires
of citizens, interest groups, and elected officials, seems fruitless‖).
269. See Posner, supra note 74, at 835.
270. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 7.
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and Posner dismiss these concerns by noting that states develop institutions ―that ensure that governments choose generally
consistent policies over time—policies that at a broad level can
be said to reflect the state‘s interest.‖273 Posner has explained
that domestic processes are ultimately unhelpful for predicting
state behavior.274
Rational choice theory naturally raises the question of
where state preferences come from and how they are formed.275
Although the theory recognizes that the state has many different interests including security, prosperity, and international
stability, to name just a few, it does not provide an account of
how those interests are prioritized or balanced.276 In addition,
one factor that Goldsmith and Posner take little notice of is the
possibility of the state being undermined by its own institutions. The public choice analysis demonstrates that even if
leaders formulate unitary preferences, they cannot always fulfill them because expansive and powerful bureaucracies may
continue to operate either outside the White House or even at
times in direct conflict with centralized policies.
The public choice approach provides more detail about the
interaction and competition of many different sub-state individuals and entities. The outcome of such processes may remain uncertain because of the difficulty of coordination. A state
may comply with international law when in its self-interest—
but figuring out the state‘s interest will often require a closer
look at domestic factors, including those discussed in this Article.
Public choice gives us a different way of understanding
even significant unitary action. It looks behind the state to see
how agencies provide inputs for interpreting international law
and formulating state policy. Moreover, if coordinating institutions are purposefully disaggregated, designed to ensure ongoing competition and uncertainty, this may affect how we con273. Id. at 8.
274. Posner, supra note 74, at 833.
275. See Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1429 (2006) (reviewing
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005)).
276. Id. at 1439 (―[A]ll rationalist analyses leave open critical questions
about the nature of the international system and the role of human agency,
ideas, and preferences within it. Where do actors come from? How do they
know what moves (in game-theoretic terms) are available to them? Where do
their preferences come from? Rationalists ignore these issues for the purpose
of simplicity, but in doing so they run the danger of assuming away some of
the most important questions about the international system.‖).
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ceptualize state interests. Institutions may be designed less for
consistency and more for maximizing flexibility and responsiveness to particular circumstances. Unitariness suggests a
sort of stability in the methods of interest formation, but public
choice analysis posits that interest formation occurs through a
constant process of competition and negotiation that may be
less stable than unitary theories predict.
B. EXPLOITING THE INDETERMINACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to highlighting some of the limitations of unitary state theories, the public choice analysis in this Article offers several predictions about the use and development of international law.277 Disaggregated theories, like unitary ones,
reach different conclusions about the development of international law and the likelihood of compliance. The prevailing liberal or disaggregated theories predict that a shift to domestic,
non-state actors will result in greater precision and more compliance with international law. Yet they do not explain how the
transnational efforts of non-state actors will lead to greater
state compliance. The non-state and sub-state activity they describe may indicate an increase in international cooperation,
but this increase has no necessary connection to compliance
with international law.
By contrast, the public choice model focuses on decisionmakers who affect state choices about international law compliance—it looks at the ―they‖ behind the ―it‖. An analysis of
agency interests and incentives predicts that government officials will define compliance in instrumental terms that exploit
the indeterminacy of international law. Officials will strategically use imprecision and uncertainty in international law to
provide flexible interpretations that meet the needs of particular circumstances.
1. Competition Creates Incentives for Flexible Interpretation
The public choice analysis explains that agencies and their
legal counsel often have different perspectives and interests
277. One of the criticisms of disaggregated theories is that they fail to provide any predictions and cannot generate a theory of compliance with international law. ―The problem with disaggregating the state is that greater accuracy is purchased at the price of complexity.‖ POSNER, supra note 268, at 41; see
also GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 19 (―It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to
construct a general, tractable, and predictive liberal theory of policymaking in
a single state, let alone one that also captures the interactions of many
states.‖).

268

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:194

and interpret international law in accordance with these. Importantly, it also explains that in the absence of effective and
predictable coordination mechanisms, agencies will compete to
control international law interpretation. Competition between
agencies creates pressure to interpret international law opportunistically in the light most favorable to an agency‘s preferred
outcome. The public choice account predicts that agencies will
strategically manipulate the indeterminacy of international law
to advance their favored policy outcomes particularly with respect to high-stakes issues and new circumstances. Moreover, it
will often be rational for officials to seek out more soft law
agreements and regardless of the degree of legalization, to
press on points of uncertainty.278
As discussed above, international law has varying degrees
of softness.279 Such law exists on a continuum of legal obligation—some forms of international law have binding domestic
effect, whereas others may create international, but not domestic obligation. Moreover, international law exists on a continuum of precision—some international law agreements may be
precise and admit little interpretation, whereas other agreements have much more general terms.280 Even though some
traditional principles of international may be settled, disputes
occur in areas of indeterminacy, whether as to the content of
international law or its application in particular circumstances.
Given this indeterminacy, government officials often have a
wide range of potential interpretations.
The range of possible interpretations is not without limit—
officials must ensure that their proposals comport with some
plausible or defensible interpretation of international law. In
practice, however, this will often allow for a legitimate range of
disagreements over the application of law to specific circumstances. With the recent example of the Geneva Conventions, for
instance, different agencies pressed for applicability or nonapplicability of the Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban fighters based in part on the law, its status as customary international law, and also the political and diplomatic consequences
278. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 102, at 440 (discussing some of the
public choice benefits of soft law).
279. Id. at 421.
280. See Abbott et al., supra note 104, at 405 (discussing legalization along
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation; noting the ―remarkable
variety‖ of forms of international legalization; and explaining that ―a binary characterization sacrifices the continuous nature of the dimensions of legalization‖).
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that would follow from the President‘s decision.281 The legal
analysis related to the type and degree of obligation faced by
the United States as well as the precision of the standard to be
applied. Agency counsel then filtered the legal questions
through a variety of diplomatic, security, and military considerations and consequences.282 Similarly, with regard to the
Libya intervention, Koh gave a narrow statutory interpretation
of ―hostilities‖ in the War Powers Resolution, despite the fact
that many argued the term should be read in light of international norms, which provided a definition of hostilities that
clearly covered the armed conflict in Libya.283
As discussed above, agencies must compete with respect to
issues in areas of overlapping jurisdiction. In the ongoing
process of negotiation, agencies might use plausible interpretations of international law to attempt to defeat other agency
proposals.284 According to a traditional empire-building account
of agency behavior, agencies may say ―no‖ to the proposed actions of other agencies in order to bolster their importance.
They may do this to thwart the action of other agencies, and/or
to advance their preferred policies. Moreover, in the process of
agency negotiation and compromise, alternatives that violate
international law will be less likely to advance to the next level.
There is little incentive for any particular bureaucrat or agency
to advance a proposal that conflicts with or raises a question
about international law. When many agencies compete to advance their own agenda, lack of compliance with international
law provides opponents an easy impediment to competing policy proposals.
Although failure to comply with international law may not
necessarily block a proposal, it makes it more difficult for that
proposal to get through the process. This dynamic provides an
incentive for agencies to present their policies as compliant
with international law. Compliance with international law does
not have to depend on a unitary or centralized perception that
281. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 102–20; YOO, supra note 1, at 18– 47;
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 2.
282. See, e.g., Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, supra note 3.
283. Mary Ellen O‘Connell, U.S. Strains Credibility on Its Libya Role, CNN
OPINION (June 21, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/21/oconnell
.libya.military.
284. See Nathan A. Sales, Self Restraint and National Security, 6 J. NAT‘L
SEC. L. & POL‘Y (forthcoming 2012) (analyzing why agencies may over-enforce
international law in the national security field).
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such compliance is within the national interest. It may be simply that compliance with international law is efficacious on a
domestic level. Advocating for international law compliance
may be a strategic tactic—the domestic regulatory process may
be easier to navigate if one‘s proposals arguably comport with
international law.
In high-stakes issues, agencies may have even greater incentives to bend international law interpretation to serve their
interests. High-stakes issues include national security, the
conduct of war, diplomacy, and any other issue important
enough to attract White House attention. When an issue rises
to the level of White House decision making, the agency dynamic may be somewhat different because the agencies are not
only negotiating amongst themselves, but must also convince
the President or other key decision-makers to adopt a particular interpretation or proposal.
Agencies will sometimes strive to provide advice congenial
to the President and White House, by placing great weight on
the constitutional authority of the President and interpreting
the requirements of international law in this light. This approach, often an institutional position of OLC but also adopted
by other agencies, allows the widest scope for the President‘s
policy assessment. Other agencies, such as the State Department or Department of Defense have different missions and
cultures and may selectively interpret the requirements of international law more strictly in the contexts where this helps
their objectives. For example, these agencies argued for the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters after September 11, 2001, based on legal interpretation, but also policy concerns about diplomatic stability and the
treatment of American soldiers. Yet when seeking a legal justification for intervention in Libya without congressional authorization, the State Department legal advisor provided an interpretation of ―hostilities‖ under the War Powers Resolution that
supported the White House‘s interests in Libya, but was at
odds with the Department of Justice. Agencies at different
times in and different circumstances provide the President and
White House with advice that supports their foreign policy
objectives.
In the competitive process to direct presidential policy
making, largely waged between political appointees within the
White House and in high-level agency positions, the actual
terms of international law ―compliance‖ may be defined down
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in favor of presidential authority or pragmatic considerations of
international policy. Government actors have incentives to use
international law to their personal or agency advantage. In this
environment, executive branch interpretations of international
law will rarely remain fixed, but will vary depending on politics
and the needs of changing circumstances.
Agencies that fail in the competition for centralized control
may persist in maintaining their own view of international law.
Indeed, a commitment to international law compliance can provide a legal justification for what are, after all, acts of insubordination, refusing to follow presidential direction or for undermining presidential decisions. For example, after President
Bush announced his policy about the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, a memorandum explaining the State Department‘s alternative legal analysis was leaked.285 Similarly, some
officials in the Obama Administration have discussed internal
executive branch disputes between the State Department and
the Department of Defense with the New York Times.286 Agencies may use international law as a justification for preserving
their own course, citing fidelity to international law as a reason
for failing to follow the President.
These views may or may not be ―better‖ interpretations of
international law, but they will aggravate the indeterminacy of
international law. If two (or more) agencies within the executive branch maintain competing interpretations of international law, this furthers the perception and reality of the indeterminacy of international law. Such competition is likely to
persist given the different perspectives of executive agencies
and the incentives for sticking to one‘s position in a system
with imperfect coordination.
2. An Institutional Preference for Soft Law
Repeated use of international law for political, strategic,
and instrumental ends may create habits of flexible or instru285. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, supra note 3; see also YOO, supra
note 1, at 39; Barry et al., supra note 169.
286. See Savage, supra note 8; Savage, supra note 9. Administration leaks
may be authorized or unauthorized and sometimes even high-level administration officials may be unaware of authorization. For example, Vice President
Dick Cheney has recounted how he expressed his concern over a leak to President George W. Bush only to be informed by Steve Hadley that Hadley had
been the source and spoke to the reporter ―at the instruction of the President.‖
See DICK CHENEY, IN MY TIME: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 456
(2011).
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mental compliance. The predictions that follow from public
choice analysis thus run against disaggregated theories that
posit a shift to sub-state actors will lead to an increase in international law compliance. For example, Harold Koh has argued international law is enforced by a ―transnational legal
process‖ that involves both government officials and other nonstate actors.287 In particular, he observes that through interaction with other nations and experience with international affairs, government officials will develop a ―habit‖ of compliance
with international law.288 This occurs in part because a ―state‘s
violation of international law creates inevitable frictions and
contradictions that hinder its ongoing participation within the
transnational legal process.‖289 Similarly, Anne-Marie Slaughter identifies a process of networking between officials in different states that eventually leads to the formation of norms
and greater compliance with international law both by nonstate actors and by states.290
By contrast, the public choice account predicts that as government officials work through the requirements of international law in the process of formulating state policy, they will treat
international law instrumentally, rather than as a moral imperative or legal obligation. Competition creates incentives to keep
the terms of international law flexible—this undercuts the idea
that government actors internalize a norm of international law
compliance. They may aim for ―compliance‖ with international
law, but such compliance may be simply a commitment to the
form of international law, rather than to its substance. Thus, the
―institutional habit‖291 that Koh describes may be a commitment
to ―compliance‖ that allows the government actor to interpret international law with the maximum latitude depending on the
circumstances. Indeed, Koh‘s recent interpretation of the War
Powers Resolution, by ignoring international law altogether,
perhaps confirms this tendency among government officials.292
Compliance here does not mean that government officials
will follow international law because of a moral obligation or

287. See Koh, supra note 69, at 194 (emphasis omitted).
288. Id. at 203–05.
289. Id. at 203.
290. SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 178.
291. Koh, supra note 71, at 655.
292. See Koh, ASC BLOG, supra note 149 (explaining that an executive
branch lawyer‘s legal analysis may differ from a law professor‘s).

2011] PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

273

when such compliance is against their other interests.293 Rather it may mean simply that these officials will interpret international law to fit with other interests. Moral considerations
or a belief in the value of international law may drive some individuals, but there is little evidence that such legalisticmoralistic feeling can be attributed to large numbers of policymakers. Ordinary experience suggests such feelings, to the extent they exist, must compete with other agency imperatives
such as furthering the agency‘s mission or influencing White
House decision making. Political calculations will invariably affect how officials define and choose between lawful options. An
instrumental commitment to compliance with international law
fully accords with the rational interests of both substate actors
as well as the ―state‖ as a unitary entity.
C. SUSTAINING THE FLEXIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The public choice analysis predicts that agencies and government officials will use the actual or perceived indeterminacy
of international law strategically in order to advance their
agendas. In the American executive branch, this ongoing
process expands the range of compliant behavior, which reinforces the flexibility and ambiguity of international law. If government officials in other countries face a similar type of competition and incentive structure, these structural forces may
provide one explanation for the persistence of indeterminacy
and flexibility in international law.
The public choice analysis of international law compliance
thus reaches a different conclusion about the development of
international law from other disaggregated theories. These
theories predict that disaggregation will allow for the development of global norms and standards that are more concrete and
that states will be more likely to adhere to such norms through
the actions of sub-state actors.294 In this view, minimizing the
role of the ―state‖ allows individuals within government and
outside of it to pursue global norms and cooperation.
The general view is that disaggregation will lead to more
legalization. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter expresses optimism that the existence of disaggregated government net293. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 105 (explaining that
―routine bureaucratic compliance is based on an aggregate cost-benefit analysis, and is not the same thing as a general willingness or habit of complying
with international law against the state‘s interest‖).
294. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 169.
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works between nations will lead to the creation and enforcement of more concrete international norms and greater cooperation across nations.295 Slaughter also posits that government
networks will ―improve compliance with international law‖ in
part by using the enforcement mechanisms of national government institutions to help the work of supranational institutions.296 Similarly, Kal Raustiala suggests that transnational
networks will enhance compliance through information-sharing
and the export of ideas and technology, all of which improve cooperation between nations.297
These theories are based in part on the idea that substate
actors will cooperate with their counterparts in other countries,
particularly with regard to regulatory activities that are largely
controlled by agencies in a decentralized fashion. If bureaucrats
internalize norms of international law, as Koh suggests, the
more disaggregated the decision making, the more likely these
individuals can promote international law compliance. Moreover,
these theorists suggest that disaggregation increases the possibilities of international law, including bolstering supranational
organizations and enforcement efforts.
But it is important to properly describe the phenomenon
observed by these liberal theorists. What Koh, Slaughter and
Raustiala describe is largely the proliferation of cooperation between regulators and other officials that often do not take the
form of binding obligations.298 Slaughter‘s transgovernmental
networks ―negotiate, implement, and diffuse norms that are often precise and elaborate, and may be politically powerful

295. Id. That optimism is also expressed in the concept of a ―new world order‖ that encompasses ―a system of global governance that institutionalizes
cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all nations and their
peoples may achieve greater peace and prosperity, improve their stewardship
of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human dignity.‖ Id. at 15.
296. Id. at 183 (―[G]overnment networks also improve compliance with international law. Indeed, vertical government networks exist essentially for
that purpose, to use personal relationships to harness the power of national
government institutions in the service of their counterpart supranational institutions. This approach strengthens compliance by backing enforcement efforts with genuine coercive authority—at least as much as is typically exercised by a domestic court or regulatory agency.‖).
297. Raustiala, supra note 67, at 80–83.
298. See POSNER, supra note 268, at 41 (explaining that Koh and Slaughter
do not always focus on compliance with international law by states, but generally consider the importance of ―international cooperation‖ between individuals and entities other than states).
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though not binding as a matter of [international law].‖299 The
focus here is on disaggregation of international activity to include sub-state actors—this identifies the external transnational work between government actors in different countries.
Domestic agencies serve as international actors in their own
right.300 From this proliferation of international norms, Slaughter and others predict that international law will become more
precise and that there will be greater state compliance with international law norms.
Yet it is not clear how the proliferation of international cooperation necessarily leads to harder forms of legalization or
greater compliance by states. There appears to be an intuition
that more working together across borders will lead to the solidification of international law regimes, tighter international
law obligations, and more compliance, but the mechanism of
how this occurs remains unspecified. Indeed, one could just as
easily predict that if non-state actors achieve their goals
through soft legalization there may be little incentive to struggle to achieve harder forms of international legalization.301
Unlike disaggregated theories focused on transnational cooperation, public choice analysis in this Article focuses on internal disaggregation in the American executive branch—the
government officials who analyze and interpret international
law. It couples this with institutional factors, such as the availability of coordination mechanisms. Given the often divergent
agency interests and imperfect institutional coordination, governmental officials can benefit from ambiguity and flexibility
in international law. Bureaucratic competition to control centralized decision making creates powerful incentives for keeping international legal agreements and customary international law flexible and open-ended.302 Greater clarity in
international law, both treaties and customary international
law, would limit the range of policy alternatives in compliance
with international law.
299. Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for
the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 27.
300. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 31–35; see also Abbott, supra note
299, at 27; Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law,
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 210 & n.50 (2004) (noting that the disaggregated activity is conducted by ―the agent of the state as agent‖).
301. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 102, at 456 (―[S]tates and nonstate
actors can achieve many of their goals through soft legalization that is more
easily attained or even preferable.‖).
302. See supra note 132.
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These sub-state actors, the ones who will negotiate, draft,
and enforce international law norms, have an incentive to retain the flexibility and ambiguity in international law. They
may at times benefit from regulatory cooperation with their
foreign counterparts or even from more precise norms. Yet most
agency actors and legal counsel can benefit over time by retaining interpretive flexibility because they do not know whether
and how international law will limit future activities. Having a
wide range of compliant alternatives allows officials to tailor
legal analysis to meet policy objectives.
A comparative study of international law compliance in
other countries would allow us to predict whether this internal
competition and incentives for flexibility are pervasive in nations that formulate the terms of international law. If the bureaucracies of other states have similar incentives to maintain
the flexibility of international law, this would suggest a significant difficulty with generating harder—more precise, more
binding—forms of international law. It may be that other countries are different, or not as structurally disaggregated as the
United States, but most liberal democracies also have elaborate
and diverse bureaucracies that might compete over the meaning and interpretation of international law. The few available
accounts of this suggest that this might be the case.303 If public
choice yielded similar observations in other countries, this
would help explain what we see in the world—many states and
government officials call for greater specificity and enforcement
of international law, but at the same time enter into agreements that allow for interpretive flexibility.304
The public choice account provides evidence of domestic
competition between agencies and failures to coordinate that,
at a minimum, should temper the optimism of disaggregated
theories that suggest transnational networks will help develop
global norms of behavior and increase compliance with international law. With regard to predicting whether states will comply with international law, the public choice analysis focuses
more directly on the agencies and actors who determine questions of state compliance. It focuses on agency interests and incentives given the persistence of imperfect coordination. In this
303. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 169–80; Jochen A. Frowein, Legal Advice for Foreign Policy in Germany, 23 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 25, 25–27
(2005) (describing formation of international legal policy in Germany).
304. See GUZMAN, supra note 35, at 122 (arguing that many states behave
this way as a means of risk avoidance and self-preservation).

2011] PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

277

manner, the public choice analysis may better predict how and
in what manner the state complies with international law.
CONCLUSION
Over the past ten years, numerous legal disputes about the
content and applicability of international law to the war on terror have been made public. Some statutes and judicial opinions
cover these matters—but many significant questions are essentially left to the executive branch. Here agencies with different
interests and perspectives often disagree, particularly as new
circumstances arise and there is little state practice or
precedent to guide analysis. This dynamic has been largely
overlooked in theories about international law compliance. The
approach of this Article has been to demonstrate how the ―they‖
of the executive branch can function as an ―it.‖ Although the
President may make a final legal and policy determination, he
does so by drawing on the advice of executive branch agencies
and entities designed to provide expert opinion on such matters. These agencies, however, will interpret international law
in light of their different interests, outlooks, and incentives.
This provides valuable information to the President about the
range of legal, political, diplomatic, and military consequences
of particular options. But institutional coordination of these interests remains imperfect. The benefits of a full hearing may
come at the cost of ongoing disagreement and insubordination
even after the President has made a final decision.
This dynamic has consequences for international law compliance in the United States. In the competition for control over
centralized decisions, agencies may use international law to
suit their purposes—taking advantage of indeterminacy in international law to further their goals. The persistence of instability and lack of coordination creates incentives to use international law strategically. In the current environment difficult
questions about the content and applicability of international
law to the use of force will continue to arise. Analyzing the consequences of executive branch legal interpretation provides
another way to understand the limits and possibilities of international law compliance in these new contexts.

